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PURCHASE-MONEY MORTGAGES AND
STATE LINES: A STUDY IN CONFLICT-
OF-LAWS METHOD
BRAINERD CURRIE* and MARK S. LIEBERMANt
I
THE PROBLEM
A NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE, enacted in 1933, provides:'
in all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers
of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of trust hereafter executed, or
where judgment or decree is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage
executed after the ratification of this act to secure payment of the balance of
the purchase price of real property, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the
notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a
deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation
secured by the same: Provided, said evidence of indebtedness shows upon the
face that it is for balance of purchase money for real estate: Provided, further,
that when said note or notes are prepared under the direction and supervision
of the seller or sellers, he, it, or they shall cause a provision to be inserted in
said note disclosing that it is for purchase money of real estate; in default of
which the seller or sellers shall be liable to purchaser for any loss which he
might sustain by reason of the failure to insert said provision as herein set out.
Within limits, it is perfectly dear what this statute means. Mr. V,
a citizen and resident of North Carolina, sells North Carolina land to
his neighbor, Mr. P, also a citizen and resident of North Carolina. The
*A.B. 1937, LL.B. 1935, Mercer University; LL.M. I94, J.S.D. z955, Columbia
University. Member of the Georgia and Illinois bars. Contributor to legal publications.
Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The authors are indebted to Miss Anne von
der Lieth, J.D. x958, Stanford University, for valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
tJ.D. 1959, University of Chicago.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §45-71.38 (1957).
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price is $io,ooo, of which Mr. P pays $2,000 in cash. The balance of
$8,o00 is represented by P's notes payable to V, secured by a deed of
trust with power of sale. Upon P's default, the deed of trust is fore-
dosed, either by exercise of the power of sale or by a proceeding in a
North Carolina court. The proceeds of sale available for application in
satisfaction of the indebtedness amount to $5,000. If V asks the fore-
closure court for a judgment for the deficiency of $3,000, or, in the case
of foreclosure by exercise of the power of sale, if he brings suit in a
North Carolina court for the deficiency, his demand will be refused.
This much, at least, the legislature dearly intended; this, indeed,
may be all that was consciously visualized by any individual member
of the legislature. But situations may arise in which the facts deviate
from those of the simple case that has been stated. Suppose, for
example, that Mr. V is unwilling to finance the transaction by accepting
P's notes and deed of trust, and that P is required to apply to a bank or
some other third party for a loan, giving the deed of trust to the third
party and paying V the full purchase price in cash. When the deed of
trust is foreclosed at the instance of the third party, is he similarly
precluded by the statute from obtaining a deficiency judgment? I.e., is
the deed of trust in this instance one "to secure payment of the balance
of the purchase price of real property"? 2  Or suppose that V sells
Blackacre to P and, to secure payment of part of the purchase price,
takes P's notes secured by a mortgage on Whiteacre.' Is this a pur-
chase-money mortgage with respect to which the statute denies the right
to a deficiency judgment? Or suppose that V is not content with P's
undertaking alone, but requires a surety on the notes; does the statute
give the surety a defense against V's action for the deficiency? 4  It is
the task of the courts to find answers to such questions. The method
employed is that of statutory construction or interpretation. It involves
an attempt to ascertain what the legislature meant, in part by reference
to definitions which have been established in other contexts for terms
.employed in the statute, and in part by resort to such "legislative his-
tory" as may be available; beyond this, it involves an attempt to ascer-
tain the legislative purpose, and to impute to the legislature an "inten-
tion" to include the marginal situation or not according to whether
'Cf. Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Mitchell, 93 Ore, 668, 184. Pac. z2 (99).
s See Dobias v. White, 239 N.C. 4o9, so S.E.2d 23 (1954.). In this paper, we shall
use the term "mortgage" to include deeds of trust.
"Cf. Note, 17 N.C.L. RE'V. 179 (1939); Comment, 3 U.C.L.A..L. REV. 197, 2ox
(1956).
[Vol. x96o: x
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analysis indicates that inclusion would serve, or disserve, or be irrelevant
to that purpose."
There are other ambiguities in the statute. One of its most note-
worthy characteristics is its unqualified generality. It applies to "all"
sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of
sale contained in "any" mortgage or deed of trust executed after its
enactment. The language is quite broad enough to cover the case in
which a resident of Virginia sells Virginia land to a Virginia purchaser
and sues in a Virginia court to recover the deficiency. Yet we know
perfectly well that it was not intended to apply to that case and that it
would not be applied by a Virginia court in such a case. Between the
extremes of this totally foreign case and the totally domestic case which
was first assumed, however, lie an indeterminate number of "mixed"
cases-cases in which there are one or more foreign elements that may
be significant. Suppose that the parties, the land, and the transaction
are all associated with Virginia at the time of the transaction, but that
the purchaser then moves to North Carolina, making it necessary for
the action for the deficiency to be brought in North Carolina? Or that
the case is entirely domestic except that the land is located in Virginia?
Or consider the famous case which actually arose a few years after the
statute was enacted:
On March 5, 194o, W. H. Bullington, a resident of Virginia, sold
to Dr. Furman Angel, a resident of North Carolina, real estate located
in Roanoke, Virginia, for $iiooo. On delivery of a warranty deed,
Angel paid $5oo in cash, executed sixteen interest-bearing negotiable
notes aggregating $3,ioo, and assumed an FHA loan for $7,400, to
secure which the vendor had previously encumbered the property. The
notes for the balance of the purchase money, payable to the vendor,
were secured by a deed of trust with power of sale. The contract was
made and the notes were payable in Virginia. Angel defaulted after
making only the down payment, and on May 29, i94o, the trustee
foreclosed by exercising the power of sale. The vendor bid in the
property for $25, subject to the outstanding indebtedness of $7,4oo; he
then sued the purchaser in the Superior Court of Macon County, North
See generally DOWLING, PATTERSON, & POWELL, MATERIALS FOR LEGAL METHOD
ch. VI (2d ed. (Jones) 1952); CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14
(192i) ; Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 886 (1930);
Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, I U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1933); Jones,
Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 4o COLUM. L. REV. 957 (940) ; Heydon's
Case, 3 Coke 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. x1584); Sanders & Wade, Legal Writings
on Statutory Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv. 569 (.950).
Vol. i.96o: i]
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Carolina, to recover the deficiency-$3,Ioo with interest if the amount
bid is considered equivalpnt to the costs of foreclosure. The purchaser
invoked the act of I933 as a complete defense. Should the statute be
applied in this situation?6
There was a time, apparently, when the applicability of a law to a
situation involving mixed domestic and foreign factors, like its applica-
bility to an atypical domestic situation, was approached in terms of con-
struction or interpretation. Thus, Lord Kames, discussing the practice
of the Scottish Court of Session in a work which was familiar to
eighteenth-century American lawyers, 7 said:'
Several intricate questions arise from the different prescriptions that are
established in different countries. In our decisions upon this head it is com-
monly disputed, whether a foreign prescription or that of our own country
ought to be the rule. This ought never to be disputed; for every case that
comes under our own law, must be decided by that law and not by the law
of any other country. When the matter is accurately considered, the debate
will be found to turn upon a different point, viz., whether the case in question
comes under our prescription. This may often be a doubtful point; because
many cases come under the words of a statute, that are not comprehended
under its spirit and intendment .... What only belongs to the present subject,
is the effect that ought to be given to foreign prescriptions where our own
are not applicable; and the subject thus circumscribed will be found abun-
dandy simple and plain.
Even in modem times, we occasionally find such an approach.' In
general, however, this method has fallen into desuetude because of the
availability of what purports to be an easier, more efficient, and more
scientific method, which, moreover, has the virtue of resolving differ-
ences between the laws of various states and nations and tends to
promote a general legal order by fostering certainty and uniformity,
producing the same result irrespective of where the action may happen
to be brought, and hence vindicating the expectations of the parties.
The North Carolina statute on purchase-money mortgages is by no
'Bullington v. Angel, 22o N.C. 1S, x6 S.E.2d 411, 136 A.L.R. 1054 (1941).
7KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (176o). See 2 CROSSKE, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, I339-40 n. 16 (1953); Sack,
Conflict of Laws in the History of English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS
342 (i937)5 Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9(.958).
s KAMES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 283.
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); see Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A
Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1959).
(Vol. x96o: I
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means unique in its generality. "Most statutes are formulated with
regard to only the ordinary or internal situations and on the problems
of Conflict of Laws they are silent. Their sphere of application or use
is to be determined through the principles of Conflict of Laws."' 0 What
are these principles? Did the legislature, at some remote time in the
past, lay down a set of rules for determining the application of all its
future enactments to mixed cases? Of course not; any such undertaking
would assume superhuman powers of prescience. Are they, then, de-
rived from limits which in the nature of things circumscribe the power
of a state to affect legal relations? Even first-year law students today
would be skeptical of principles so derived. Are they imposed by the
Federal Constitution? The Constitution has a significant bearing on
such matters. Historically, however, writers on conflict of laws have
been indifferent to it, though in recent years they have exaggerated and
distorted it, reading the principles of the system into the Constitution
by a kind of bootstrap operation." But the Constitution, unimple-
mented by congressional legislation, by no means furnishes a compre-
hensive set of principles for the solution of conflict-of-laws problems.
Are they principles which have been agreed to by the courts, if not the
political departments, of states and nations generally, as a matter of
mutual deference and restraint, for the sake of a uniform legal order?
To some extent, they are precisely that; yet the student, the lawyer, the
judge, or the scholar who seeks guidance from the principles on this
basis, expecting to find a coherent and reliable system, is doomed to
frustration. There is by no means general agreement on the principles
of conflict of laws. Moreover, even to the extent that there is agree-
ment on principles, the system is distinguished by its manipulability and
by the strong temptations to manipulate which it produces. The prin-
ciples are frequently so unrelated to those which would be employed
in the construction of a statute or the interpretation of a common-law
10 Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 430, 449-50
(1941), ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS 133, 140 (1956) [hereinafter cited AALS READINGS]. See also Cheatham &
Reese, Choice of the Applicable Laws, 5z COLUM. L. REV. 959, 961 (1952). Cf. Cook,
"Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties, 32 ILL. L. Rav. 899,
908 (1938), AALS READINGS 639, 648-49.
" See infra pt. VI; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, z6 U. CHI L.
REV. 9 (1958) Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73
HARV. L. REV. 36 (1959)- Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 43 (x934) ; id.,
cl. 1z, topic 4, Note; RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAWS 20 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1956); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 12 (1959)i Kryger v. Wilson, 242
U.S. 171 (1916).
Vol. i96o: i]
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rule, and to the considerations which lead one to feel that a given de-
cision is just or unjust, that we find courts resorting to all sorts of
stratagems and disingenuous devices to rescue the interest of a state
from the machinations of the system' 2 or to reach what is thought to
be a just result.13
The relevant principles of conflict of laws consist, in the main, of a
body of "choice-of-law" rules, together with ancillary principles which
determine the manner in which the choice-of-law rules are employed.
Choice-of-law rules have certain characteristics which distinguish them
from other rules of law; but one characteristic which they have in com-
mon with many, if not most, other rules is that they do not become
accessible until a preliminary determination has been made. In the
Restatement,14 for example, we find such rules as the following: "The
validity and effect of a mortgage on land is determined by the law of
the state where the land is";' 5 "The law of the place of contracting
determines the validity and effect of a promise with respect to ... the
nature and extent of the duty for the performance of which a party
becomes bound"' 6 "The duty for the performance of which a party is
bound will be discharged by compliance with the law of the place of
performance of the promise with respect to . . . the sufficiency of per-
formance ... 1., 17 and "All matters of procedure are governed by the
law of the forum."'1 8 Just as we cannot know whether the North Caro-
lina statute under discussion is applicable until we have determined that
it is a purchase-money mortgage that is involved, so we cannot select
among these rules for choice of law until we have determined whether
we are confronted with a question of the effect of a mortgage on land,
the nature and extent of a contractual duty, the sufficiency of perform-
ance, or of procedure. The process of determination is called "charac-
terization," and is one with respect to which the principles of conflict
12 See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, io STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958) 5 Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Con-
flict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171.
1" Cf. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV 173
(1933), AALS READINGS IO1 LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 99-oo (1959); EHREN-
ZWEIG, op. cit. supra note ii, at 1355 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 98 o-8 i (1952).
", RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (934).
'5 Id. § 225.
Is1d. § 332.27 Id. § 358.
18Id. § 585.
[Vol. i96o: x
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of laws offer little guidance.19 Courts characterize pretty much as they
please, and there is little in the system on which to base criticism-
much less prediction. Criticism is reduced to a rather sterile process of
asseveration. 20
In Bullington v. Angel, 2 1 the North Carolina Supreme Court char-
acterized the problem before it-or at least the North Carolina statute-
as one relating to procedure, and hence held that the statute supplied a
defense to the action.22 The language, "shall not be entitled to a
deficiency judgment," was regarded as a limitation upon the jurisdic-
tion of the courts. It "closes the courts of this State" to plaintiffs
seeking deficiency judgments on purchase-money mortgages; it operates
upon "the adjective law of the State, which pertains to the practice and
procedure, or legal machinery whereby the substantive law is made
effective, and not upon the substantive law itself."23 Since we are told
that "The court at the forum determines according to its own Conflict
of Laws rule whether a given question is one of substance or proce-
dure,"224 and since the North Carolina Supreme Court has authorita-
tively declared that the question in Bullington v. Angel was one of
procedure, further discussion would appear to be nearly futile. There
may be room for inquiry as to whether the court correctly applied
North Carolina law in arriving at its decision: e.g., one might seek to
determine whether the decision in this case is consistent with North
"9 See ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940) ; Loren-
zen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 2o COLUM. L. REV. 247
(1920) ;LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS So (1947);
Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict
of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 ('94i), AALS Readings 115; Falconbridge, Charac-
terization in the Conflict of Laws, 53 L.Q. REV. 235 (1937); Cook, "Characterization?'
in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE LJ. 191 (iq.i) ; COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF THE CONFLICT Or LAWS ch. VIII (194z); Pascal, Characterization as an
Approach to the Conflict of Laws, z LA. L. REV. 715 (194o) ; Cormack, Renvoi, Char-
acterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the Conflict of Laws, 14 So.
CAL. L. REV. 221, 387 (1941); Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 1027 (1949); Beckett, The Question of Classification ("Qualification")
in Private International Law, 15 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 46 (1934); Cheatham, Internal
Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 570 (1936); GOODRICH,
CONFLICt OF LAWS 15 ( 3 d ed. 1949) ; Leflar, op. cit. supra note 12, ch. 7.
20 Cf. Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 128,
139 (1958): "It is inescapable that the basic problem is one of tort recovery." See
also ROBERTSON, op. cit. supra note i9, at 228 n. 24.
Supra note 6.
"The court's decision may also be regarded as a rather literal interpretation of the
statute.
.3 22o N.C. at 2o, 16 S.E.zd at 4x2.
" RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (1934).
Vol. i96o: i]
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Carolina decisions dealing with similar problems of characterization;
but surely little is to be gained by disputation as to whether the ques-
tion "is" one of the effect of a mortgage, or the extent of a contractual
duty, or the sufficiency of performance of a contractual duty, rather than
a question of procedure. Such research as might be constructive would
be limited to North Carolina materials and would tell us little of how
the system of conflict of laws operates to solve such problems. We
might attempt to evaluate the decision in terms of the ideals of the
system-as by pointing out that the decision does not further the ideal
of uniformity of result; but this merely begs the question, since the
system tolerates disuniformities which result from differences in pro-
cedure. In short, the system provides no resources in aid of a critical
examination of the decision.
Yet the decision is a troublesome one, one which cries out for criti-
cal analysis. This is true, first of all, because of the unanswered con-
stitutional question posed by the decision. The North Carolina Supreme
Court denied that the statute as applied violated the Full Faith and
Credit Clause; 2" the Supreme Court of the United States in a later
stage of the litigation did not rule on the question, treating it as res
judicata.26 It is true, secondly, because if the system which purports
to guide decision in such matters is bankrupt, we certainly need a sub-
stitute for it; it would be naive, however, to expect a great deal in the
way of progress toward such a goal. It is true, thirdly, and above all,
because lawyers need a basis for predicting how courts will decide such
questions. They need it when they are advising the prospective parties
to a purchase-money mortgage as well as when they are about to embark
upon litigation concerning a deficiency. Much is said in defense of the
existing system of conflict of laws about its virtues in terms of certainty
and predictability; yet here is an instance in which the system provides
no basis at all for prediction.
25 2zo N.C. at zo, 16 S.E.zd at 41z.
"Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). After losing in the North Carolina
Supreme Court, the plaintiff filed the identical action in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, which gave judgment for the plaintiff.
Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.N.C. 1944). The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed, Angel v. Bullington, 150 F.2d 679 (i94s). The Supreme
Court reversed, holding: (i) that under the Erie doctrine, the North Carolina statute,
if constitutional, precluded recovery in federal courts in North Carolina as well as in
the state courts; and (2) that the issue as to the constitutionality of the statute was
res judicata, the plaintiff having failed to appeal from the state court's adverse decision
on that issue. Fully agreeing with the opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court,
we shall concern ourselves with the case in the federal courts only in connection with
the constitutional question.
[Vol. i96o: i
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For these reasons, we propose in this paper to resort to the older
method of determining the applicability of laws to mixed cases: the
method of construction and interpretation. By this method, we hope
to ascertain the governmental policy-social, economic, or administra-
tive-expressed in the statute, and the situations in which, though there
are foreign elements in the case, North Carolina would have a legitimate
interest in, or a reasonable basis for, the application of that policy. By
this method also, we hope to throw some light on the unanswered con-
stitutional question. We do not have much hope of undermining the
system; despite its lack of utility in the solution of such problems as this,
it is pretty well entrenched behind hard covers, and its glib rules and
seductive mysticism will continue to create the illusion that it offers an
easier and better way than the hard resort to ordinary legal techniques
which we propose to employ. We do expect, however, to provide
some assistance for the practicing lawyer who must predict how courts
will decide questions relating to the applicability of domestic law to
mixed cases. For we believe that this kind of analysis provides the best
available basis for prediction: courts may sometimes decide conflicts
cases merely by mechanical application of the rules and concepts of the
systemi they may sometimes disregard or manipulate the system for
the sake of reaching a "just" or "progressive" result; but the likeliest
explanation of a court's application of domestic law to a mixed case is
that the court has perceived-or has been persuaded-that such apph-
cation is consistent with the legitimate furtherance of domestic policy.
II
THE STATUTE IN CONTEXT
The most superficial interpretation of the policy embodied in the
North Carolina statute was one suggested, apparently, in an effort to
support the court's interpretation of it as dosing the courts to actions
for deficiency judgments: "The purpose for which the statute in the
instant case was enacted is not stated by the North Carolina court. Con-
ceivably, it could have been enacted to relieve court dockets. 26 a True,
docket congestion is a timeless problem; 27 yet there is no indication
that the problem was especially acute in North Carolina in 1 9 3 3 o2s
6m Note, z6 N.C.L. REV. 6o, 64. n. 34 ('947)-
'T Cf. ZEISEL, KALVEN, & BucHoLz, DELAY IN THE COURT 19 (x959).
Cf. Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina, ii N.C.L. REv. 51 (s93z).
There appears to have been no particular concern over actions between nonresidents or
foreign corporations; the court had apparently rejected the doctrine of forum non con-
Vol. i96o: I]
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Even if it was, why exclude actions to recover mortgage deficiencies?
The action is on a written obligation of a commercial character; it typi-
cally involves relatively simple issues, or none at all; it involves none
of the objectionable characteristics which sometimes lead legislatures to
close the doors of the courts in the interest of good judicial administra-
tion.29  Why limit the statute to purchase-money mortgages-presum-
ably a small percentage of all real estate mortgages-when the suit for
deficiency in connection with such a mortgage must have the same
characteristics as the suit for deficiency under any real estate mortgage?
And why limit the statute to purchase-money mortgages on real estate?
Creditors were still allowed to sue for deficiencies after repossession and
sale under conditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages." The
conclusion is inescapable that the statute was not enacted for the purpose
of relieving court dockets, nor, indeed, for any purpose related to court
administration. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the court's
determination that the statute deprived the courts of jurisdiction; per-
haps it did, but we still do not know why the legislature deprived the
courts of jurisdiction. The legislature might in so many words have
provided that "no court of this state shall have jurisdiction" to grant a
veniens. McDonald v. McArthur Bros. Co., 154 N.C. iz2, 69 S.E. 832 (90); see
Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 388 1. 40
(1947). See also, Miller v. Black, 53 N.C. 341 (.855).
Of course, there may have been an unsual amount of litigation relating to mortgage
foreclosure. Thus, an act of the Arkansas legislature provided: "On account of the
congestion of court dockets by foreclosure suits, and to provide time for trying other
cases, foreclosure decrees, and decrees confirming foreclosure sales, shall only be ren-
dered during the first three days of the regular term of court as fixed by law." Ark.
Acts 47 (1933). But abolishing the right of action when suits become numerous is a
drastic way of dealing with docket congestion; moreover, the North Carolina statute,
addressed to future mortgages only, could not relieve congestion of the sort with which
Arkansas was concerned, since that resulted from the effects of the depression on existing
mortgages.
Even this concern over docket congestion is probably disingenuous. The statute
appears to have been a moratory device. In Arkansas .. . . there are only two chancery
terms ... ; moreover, sales may be confirmed only on these days, so that a decree taken
at one term provides for a sale which cannot be confirmed until the term six months
later; the net result [since the defendant had 90 days to answer] is that no suit can be
completed in less than nine months from the date of filing." Eaton, Deficiency Judg-
ihents and Decrees, zo VA. L. REV. 743, 746 (-934).
" Cf. the New York statute abolishing the right of action for alienation of affec-
tions, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of promise to marry, N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. ACT. §§ 61a-6ii, discussed in Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory"
Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 36 (.959).
'0 Mitchell v. Battle, 31 N.C. 68, 55 S.E.d 803 (949).
[Vol. i96o: z
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deficiency judgment in connection with purchase-money mortgages on
real estate; the question would remain: Why?
Nothing in the way of conventional legislative history is available
to shed light on the purpose of the legislation. There are no committee
reports and no record of the legislative debates; even contemporary
editorial comment is lacking. We are not, however, entirely without
evidence on which to base a judgment. The year 1933 was one of deep
depression, and North Carolina, along with other states, was concerned
with the economic distress associated with wholesale mortgage fore-
closures.31 The act which has been quoted--chapter thirty-six of the
Laws of 1933-was the first in a series of legislative attempts at the
same session to deal with the mortgage problem. It was enacted on
February 6. On February 9, the legislature approved a joint resolution
requesting a voluntary moratorium until November I, 1934, on all
principal payments secured by mortgages on farm lands and homes, so
long as interest and taxes were paid." On April 18, chapter 275 was
enacted, dealing rather comprehensively with the foreclosure problem.3
Section one empowered the courts, prior to confirmation of any fore-
closure sale of real estate, to enjoin the sale or its confirmation on the
ground that the amount bid or price offered was inadequate and inequi-
table and would result in irreparable damage. Section two authorized
the courts, prior to confirmation, to order resale upon such terms as
might be just and equitable. Section three provided that in suits for
deficiency judgments after the exercise of a power of sale, the mort-
gagor, if the holder of the obligation was the purchaser at the sale,
could defend by showing that the property was fairly worth the amount
of the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale.34 All of these
provisions applied to existing mortgages; they included, without being
-limited to, purchase-money mortgages. On May 15, the time within
"' In 1932, there were 249,ooo foreclosures of nonfarm mortgages, with a value
of $1,494,000,000 in 1933, 252,000 foreclosures of mortgages with a value of
$1,512,000,ooo. In 1932, there were 256,ooo foreclosures of farm mortgages with a
value of $768,ooo,ooo the foreclosure rate was 38.8 per thousand farms. i GOLD-
SMITH, A STUDY OF SAVING IN THE UNITED STATES 745-51 tables M-22 and M-28
(1955). For contemporary descriptions of the economic crisis, see Note, 47 HAIWv. L.
REv. 299 (1933) 5 Brabner-Smith, Economic Aspects of the Deficiency Judgment, 20 VA.
L. REV. 719 (2934); Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments During an Economic
Depression, 2o VA. L. REV. 771 (2934) ; Jennings & Sullivan, Legal Planning for Agri-
culture, 42 YALE L.J. 878, 886 et seq. (933) ; Comment, 42 YALE L.J. 2236 (2933);
Carey, Mortgage Foreclosures in Cook County, 29 A.B.A.J. 275 (2933).
"N.C. Pub. Laws 953 (s933)-
"
5N.C. Pub. Laws 401 (933), now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (1957).
" Section 3 applied to personal as well as real property.
VCol. i96o: I]
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which actions for deficiencies might be brought was limited to one year
from the date of sale.35
The impact of chapter 275 may be indicated by a brief summary
of the changes which it effected in North Carolina law. Under the
prior law, if a substantially higher bid was made within ten days after
sale, either under power or by court order, the sale was reopened and
a resale was required." In the absence of an upset bid, the courts had
little control over the sale and of the deficiency which might result.
North Carolina followed the general rule that the amount realized
upon the sale was conclusive of market value, and a deficiency judgment
could be recovered for the difference between the debt (plus interest,
costs, and taxes) and the amount realized on the sale." The courts
had a general supervisory authority over foreclosures, especially by
proceedings in equity, 8 and it may be that the North Carolina courts in
the depression years, like other courts, indulged in the practice of
refusing to confirm sales because of "fictional irregularities.1au In gen-
eral, however, the foreclosure satisfied the debt only to the extent of
the amount produced by the sale; mere allegations of inadequacy of
the price would not justify an order setting aside the sale unless the
inadequacy was so great as to suggest fraud or "shock the conscience'
of the court.40  In Bolick v. Prudential Insurance Co.41 the court held
specifically that "mere allegations of general depression before the
property has been sold and an unconscionable purchase price established"
would not warrant enjoining the exercise of a power of sale in a deed
of trust
2
The power of a court of equity to restrain sales of real estate made in
pursuance of the terms of a mortgage or deed of trust is undoubted ...
However, the exercise of the beneficent powers of equity has usually been
"N.C. Pub. Laws 88o (1933). Two bills relating to a moratorium on fore-
closures (S.B. 424 and 432) failed to pass. N.C.S. JOUR. 364, 370, 403 (1933). In
addition, various local laws provided for moratoria. See N.C. PUBLIC-LOCAL AND
PRIVATE LAWS 48, 303, 480 (1933); Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage
Debtor During the Depression, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 517, 521 n. z5 (1938).
"eN.C. CODE ANN. § 2591 (Michie 193').
'See Notes, -i N.C.L. REV. 172 (1932); 82 U. PA. L. REV. z61 (1934).
8 Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124
(1937). Cf. N.C. CODE ANN. § 2591 (Michie i93i); In re Ware, 187 N.C. 693, x2
S.E. 66o (.924).
"
9 Note, 8z U. PA. L. REV. z61, 263 (1934).
"'Roberson v. Matthews, 2oo N.C. 24.1, x56 S.E. 496 (1931); Weir v. Weir, x96
N.C. 268, 145 S.E. z8 (1928).
01 202 N.C. 789, 164 S.E. 335 (-932).
42 2o2 N.C. at 792, 164 S.E. at 336-37.
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based upon allegations of fraud, restraint, oppression, usury, mistake and other
facts disclosing unconscionable advantage. Unless such elements are alleged,
the courts have refused to stay the exercise of a power of sale . . . when all
the necessary requisites of a valid sale have been observed and pursued.43
Although the Bolich case, narrowly construed, held only that the mere
prospect of an inadequate price because of depressed conditions would
not warrant an injunction, the practice appears to have been to confirm,
or to refuse to set aside, sales regardless of allegations as to inadequacy
of price.44
Thus, prior to 1933, deficiency judgments were obtainable as a
matter of course, no distinction being made with respect to purchase-
money mortgages; and, apart from the statutory upset bid and the equi-
table doctrine of unconscionable price, the amount realized at the sale
was the amount to be credited against the debt, rather than some alter-
native measure of the value of the land. By contrast, after the 1933
legislature had done its work, the courts were authorized to enjoin the
sale or its confirmation, and to order resale, on the ground that the bid
or price was inadequate or inequitable; and, if the sale was pursuant
to power rather than court order, and the holder of the obligation
became the purchaser, the mortgagor could prove the fair value of the
land in defense to the action for the deficiency. In addition, the right
to a deficiency judgment was abolished with respect to all future mort-
gages for purchase-money.
In Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co.)4 5 the United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the con-
stitutionality of section three of chapter 275 against the contention that
it impaired the obligation of the contract. 40  The North Carolina Su-
preme Court had previously upheld sections one and two.Y
Similar legislation, of course, was being enacted all over the coun-
try48 The dominant purpose of all this activity was obviously to relieve
2o2 N.C. at 791, 164. S.E. at 336.
"See note 40 supra.
"300 U.S. 124. (937).
'* The Court made a confusing reference to "strict foreclosure," 300 U.S. at 130,
and attributed to the court in a foreclosure suit in equity a greater degree of control
over the sale and the deficiency than can be supported by the North Carolina cases.
"Woltz v. Asheville Safe Deposit Co., zo6 N.C. 239, 173 S.E. 587 (934.);
Barringer v. Wilmington Savings Trust Co., 207 N.C. 505, 177 S.E. 795 (1935).
"'For a comprehensive summary, see Poteat, supra note 35, at 538. See also, in
addition to the works cited supra note 31, Skilton, Government and the Mortgage
Debtor, 1929-39, is TEMP. L.Q. 61 (1943) ; Friedman, The Enforcement of Personal
Liability on Mortgage Debts in New York, 51 YALE L.J. 382 (1942); Skilton, Mort-
Vol. x96o: i]
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mortgage debtors from the predicament in which they had been plhced
by the depression. Indeed, the legislation which has been noticed was
only a part of a broader legislative movement for the relief of debtors
generally.49 The specific problem with which we are concerned may be
conceived of as lying at the center of a series of concentric circles: The
problem confronting the legislatures and the courts, in its broadest out-
lines, concerned distressed debtors in general. Within this area-and
also within the reach of state, as distinguished from national, legislative
competence-the problem of the mortgage debtor presented a special,
case. Within this area, in turn, the problem of the deficiency judgment
was particularly acute. The liquidation of mortgage indebtedness, with
the ensuing loss of homes, farms, and business establishments, was bad
enough without more. When, in addition, as the result of forced sale
at depressed prices, the mortgage debtor was burdened with a judgment
which could be enforced by sale of his unmortgaged assets, the problem,
was aggravated. And, finally, when the mortgagee who foreclosed:
and obtained a deficiency judgment was the vendor who had taken the
mortgage to secure payment of the purchase price, concern for the
plight of the mortgagor appears to have aroused the greatest concern
of all. In this paper, since we are concerned with the policy of the
statute relating to deficiency judgments under purchase-money mort-
gages, we shall deal with the policy of debtor-relief legislation only to
the extent necessary to place the immediate problem in context. It will
be necessary to consider in some detail laws directed against deficiency
judgments, whether limited to purchase-money mortgages or not; we
gage Moratoria Since 1933, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 53 (1943)i Stanley, The Effect of
Economic Depression upon Foreclosure, 27 Ky. L.J. 365 (1939); Farage, Mortgage
Deficiency Judgment .Acts and Their Constitutionality, 41 DicK. L. REv. 67 (x937);
Eaton, Deficiency Judgments and Decrees, 2o VA. L. REV. 743 (x934) ; Carey, Brabner-
Smith, & Sullivan, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County: I. Foreclosure Methods and
Redemption, 27 ILL. L. REV. 595 (1933); Chamberlain, The Legislatures and Relief,
of Debtors, i9 A.B.A.J. 474 (z933).
In one famous case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court asserted the power of the courts,
without the aid of legislation, to do substantially what was authorized by ch. 275 of the
North Carolina statutes: to refuse confirmation for inadequacy of price, to order resale
and fix an upset price, and to require the mortgagee to credit against the debt the fair
value of the property. Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N.W. 556.(1933)-
"In 1933, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to provide new composition pro-
cedures and extensions for noncorporate debtors and farmers. Act of March 3, 1933, 47
Stat. 1467. See Poteat, supra note 35, at 5x8; MOORE, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS'
RIGHTs 8 (955). In the same year, Congress passed the "gold clause" act, 48 Stat..
112, The Home Owners' Loan Act, id. at xz8, and other legislation having debtor-
relief aspects.
[Vol. x96o:'x
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shall be less concerned with other types of relief for the mortgage
debtor, and still less with laws for the relief of debtors in general.
It would be a serious mistake, however, to evaluate chapter thirty-
six of the North Carolina statutes simply as a depression measure for
the relief of mortgage debtors. This is made dear, in the first place,
by the fact that the statute had prospective operation only. It con-
tributed nothing to the alleviation of the typical problem, which was
that of mortgagors who had bought, or borrowed, in times of high
prices and who had defaulted in times of low prices. The immediate
effect of the statute, at least, would be upon transactions in a critically
depressed real estate market. In its measures for relief of the typical
mortgage debtor, North Carolina made no distinction between purchase-
money mortgages and others. Moreover, the statute was designed as
a permanent change in the law-not, like much of the legislation of the
period, as a temporary emergency measure. Oregon had enacted a
statute substantially identical with chapter thirty-six of the North Caro-
lina statutes as early as 19o3.' ° So similar is the operative language of
the two statutes that the North Carolina version may well have been
modeled on that of Oregon; note particularly the italicized passage:51
When judgment or decree is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage,
hereafter executed, to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price
of real property, such judgment or decree shall provide for the sale of the real
property, covered by such mortgage, for the satisfaction of the judgment or
decree given therein, and the mortgagee shall not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment on account of such mortgage or note or obligation secured by the
same.
That, too, was a time of depression; 52 yet the statute was preventive
" ORE. REV. STAT. § 88.070 (1953).
" Ibid. (Emphasis added.) (The phrase, "hereafter executed," is omitted in the
1953 compilation as no longer necessary.) The suggestion that this was the model for
the North Carolina statute is reinforced by the proviso in the latter requiring that the
evidence of indebtedness show on its face that it is for the balance of purchase-money
for real estate. The Oregon statute had been held applicable in an action by a trans-
feree of the note and mortgage without notice that it was for purchase-money. Wright
v. Wimberly, 79 Ore. 6z6, 156 Pac. 257 (1916). Evidently the North Carolina legis-
lature knew of this construction and wished to avoid its harsh result.
" "It is a fact of which courts in Oregon should take judicial notice, that in the
year 1897 and for some time thereafter, great financial depression prevailed in the
Pacific Coast states. Persons who had purchased real property in that territory during
the earlier flush times by paying a part of the purchase price and giving a mortgage to
secure the remainder, found it impossible, if they had not disposed of the property prior
Vol, x96o: i]
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rather than therapeutic, and was highly selective. At its 19o3 session,
the Oregon legislature took no other action respecting mortgage fore-
closures. Despite the fact that it is in times of depression that legisla-
tures have addressed their attention to deficiency judgments under
purchase-money mortgages, 3 it seems dear that depression conditions
do not entirely account for such legislation, and that something more
than Cdebtor relief" was involved.54
to the monetary stagnation, to discharge their legal obligations, whereupon the fore-
closure of liens became inevitable. As there was no money then easily to be secured,
the creditor, upon a sale of the premises pursuant to the decree, usually became the pur-
chaser for almost a nominal sum and far below the mortgage debt, thereby obtaining a
recovery over upon the personal obligation of the mortgagor for the remainder, thus
taking all the property the debtor then had and jeopardizing his prospects of ever ob-
taining any more land. In order to prevent a repetition of such conduct on the part
of a creditor, [the 1903 statute] was passed." Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 17,
184 Pac. 740 (1919). Nationally, the period x898-i9o3 is rated as one of prosperity,
THORP, BUSINESS ANNALS 138-39 (x9z6). But Cf. 2 ENCYC. SOC. SCL. 95 (1933).
" In addition to North Carolina, three states in the early thirties enacted statutes
abolishing deficiency judgments on purchase-money mortgages. California: "No defi-
ciency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale under a deed of trust or mortgage
given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property." Cal.
Stats. ch. 642, § 5 (1933), amended in 1935 to read: "No deficiency judgment shall lie
in any event after any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete his
contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to secure payment of the
balance of the purchase price of real property." CAL. CODE CIv. Pgoc. § 58ob. Mon-
tana: "Upon the foreclosure of any mortgage, hereafter executed, to any vendor of real
property or to his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, for the balance of the pur-
chase price of such real property, the mortgagee shall not be entitled to a deficiency
judgment on account of such mortgage or note or obligation secured by the same."
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-6oo8 (i947). South Dakota: "When judgment or decree
is given for the foreclosure of any mortgage, hereafter executed, to secure all or any
part of the purchase price of real property, such judgment or decree shall provide for
the sale of the real property, covered by such mortgage, for the satisfaction of the judg-
ment or decree given therein, and the mortgagee shall not be entitled to any deficiency
judgment on account of such mortgage or note or obligation secured by the same." S.D.
Laws ch. 138 (1933), as amended, S.D. CODE § 39.0308 (1939). The South Dakota
statute required that the note be endorsed to show that it was for purchase-money, in
which case it was nonnegotiable5 but absence of the endorsement did not affect the rights
of the parties, which were to be ccthe same as though such note had been properly en-
dorsed." There was also a provision that the statute should not affect "the liabilities
of the parties to a contract for sale of real estate prior to the time such contract is
merged into a mortgage note and mortgage, and judgment for foreclosure or for the
amount due under such contract or any other customary judgment, may be rendered
under such contract." Ibid. The resemblance of this statute to North Carolina's, and
of both to Oregon's, is striking. The South Dakota statute was enacted February 9.
"Washington in 1897 enacted a broad scheme for debtor relief, Wash. Laws 70
(1897), including a provision limiting all future mortgagees to the property mortgaged
for the satisfaction of the debt. The provision was held unconstitutional as an unwar-
ranted infringement of liberty of contract. Dennis v. Moses, i8 Wash. 537 (1898).
[Vol. x96o: t
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III
THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE STATUTE
The first step toward understanding the purpose of the statutes
abolishing deficiency judgments on purchase-money mortgages is to
determine the type of transaction to which they applied. Except in
laws relating to deficiency judgments, purchase-money mortgages had
been distinguished from others principally in connection with problems
of priority: thus, such a mortgage excludes any claim for dower in the
land, and, though unrecorded, is superior to the lien of a prior judgment
against the mortgagor.55 For purposes of such problems, the term
was generally held to include any mortgage to secure all or part of the
purchase price given as part of a single transaction in which the property
was acquired, whether the credit was extended by the vendor or by a
third party."' For purposes of the deficiency judgment law, however,
Oregon rejected that broad definition. The rule concerning priorities
had been devised to give maximum protection to those who supplied
credit for the purchase of land; it was broadly applied to effectuate
that purpose. The deficiency statute had a different purpose:
57
A purchase-money mortgage is defined.. . as follows:
"A mortgage given, concurrently with a conveyance of land, by the
vendee to the vendor, on the same land, to secure the unpaid balance of the
purchase price."...
While this definition is not the universal one, it seems to us that in enact-
ing [the deficiency judgment law] the legislature acted with the kind of
purchase-money mortgage in view, as defined above; that is, that the pur-
pose of the law was to encourage and protect the purchaser of real estate,
which perchance is made for the purpose of obtaining a home; that it was
not the intent of the lawmakers to render it more difficult for such a pur-
chaser to obtain a loan and pay the cash for a home, and receive the benefit
of any lower price of the realty that might be made on account of such cash
payment. That if the law should be so construed that anyone obtaining a
loan and giving a real estate mortgage to a third party not the vendor of the
land to secure the payment thereof, when it was contemplated that the money
borrowed should be used in payment for the real property purchased at the
time, would be executing a mortgage "to secure payment of the balance of
the purchase price of real property," within the purview of the statute, and
that the lender could only look to the property upon a foreclosure proceeding,
1 I JONES ON MORTGAGES § 58z et seq. (8th ed. 19Z8); MACCHESNEY, PRINCIPLES
OF REAL ESTATE LAW 676-77 (1928).
c MACCHESNEY, 1OC. Cit. supra note 55; I JONES, op. cit. supra note 55, § 586.
51Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Mitchell, 93 Ore. 668, 675-76, 184 Pac. z82, 284 (1919).
VCol. i96o: I]
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then the person wishing to purchase a home or other real property, would be
hampered and.his credit impaired, and it might well be said that: "The last
state of that man is worse than the first." In such event, the beneficent pur-
pose of the law would be thwarted. It must be considered that the bank was
not speculating in real estate in the transaction; it was doing a banking busi-
ness. It was not the purpose or the intent of the law to regulate banking
business or the loaning of money. The ordinary transactions of a bank do not
come within the provisions of the act.
The court's analysis of the legislative purpose is hardly profound i
yet the limitation of the statute to the situation in which the credit is
furnished by the vendor is highly significant. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has never had occasion to determine this question of
construction, but it seems in the highest degree likely that it would
reach the same result, especially in view of the evidence indicating that
the North Carolina legislature was aware of the Oregon statute and
the construction placed upon it by the Oregon courts.5 For priority
purposes, North Carolina adhered to the general rule that a purchase-
money mortgage might .be given to a third person;5" but, like the
Oregon court, the North Carolina court would, in all probability, recog-
nize that the meaning given to the term for priority purposes is not
controlling. California has followed the Oregon ruling.0  Informed
opinion in North Carolina is to the effect that the statute does not apply
where the creditor is a third party."1 We shall, therefore, proceed on
the assumption that the statute applies only to "a mortgage given,
concurrently with a conveyance of land, by the vendee to the vendor,
on the same land, to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price."
If this is a correct interpretation of the statute and an accurate
reflection of the legislative intent, it is significantly revealing as to the
"8 See note 51 supra.
"Moring v. Dickerson, 85 N.C. 466 (i88s). "True it is, that in the case just
cited the mortgage was to the vendor of the land, but in point of right and principle it
can make no difference whether it be given to the vendor, himself, for the purchase
money, or to one who actually advances the means to pay the purchase money to the
vendor .... " Id. at 471-7z (Ruffin, J.).
"
0Peterson v. Wilson, 88 Cal. App. 2d 617, 630-31, i99 P.zd 757, 765-66 (948).
"1 Letter dated January io, 1959, from Frank W. Hanft, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of North Carolina, and member of the General Statutes Commission; letter dated
January 29, 1959, from Thomas C. Ruff, Esq., of Whitlock, Dockery, Ruff & Perry,
Charlotte; letter dated February 2, 1959, from Mr. Lex Marsh, of the Mortgage
Bankers Association of the Carolinas, Charlotte; letter dated February 13, x959, from
Mr. Carlyle McDowell, Vice President, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., Winston-Salem;
letter dated September x6, 1959, from Mr. Claude Currie, President, Security Savings
& Loan Ass'n, Durham.
[Vol. i96o: z
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legislative policy. In this light, the statute is one to regulate the
relationship of vendor and purchaser when the vendor assumes the
financing function. It has no bearing whatever upon what is probably
the more common transaction, in which the credit is extended by a third
person. It says to the vendor: "If you assume to finance the sale of
your own land, you must look solely to the security of the land for your
payment; you may not rely upon the personal obligation of the pur-
chaser." It places upon the vendor the entire risk of a decline in the
value of the property, while preserving to the purchaser the benefit of
any profit that may result from an increase in value. Moreover, it
gives the purchaser, in effect, the unilateral option to rescind a bad bar-
gain, losing no more than his down payment and whatever other pay-
ments he may have made before rescinding (or defaulting). Except
that the purchaser is not given the right to recover such payments, the
effect is the same as if all such transactions were conclusively presumed
to be fraudulent, or as if the purchaser were an infant. The latter
analogy is the better one, since the substantial protection of the statute
is afforded to the purchaser even when the notes have been transferred
to a holder without notice that they are secured by a purchase-money
mortgage. In North Carolina, this result is accomplished at the expense
of the vendor.62 In other states, it is accomplished at the expense of the
innocent transferee.63 In those states, it is literally true that the effect
of the statute is the same as if the defense of infancy were made avail-
able,64 or as if the note were rendered nonnegotiable. 5  In North Caro-
lina, the purchaser is given substantially the same protection; the only
difference is that the legislature accomplished the result more equitably
by imposing the loss on the vendor rather than the transferee. If the
Oregon statute had given the purchaser the defense of fraud without
requiring him to prove fraud in fact, presumably the defense would
not have been available against a holder in due course; as the statute
stands, the defense is so available; and, under the North Carolina
statute, while the defense is not available if the note does not show that
:2 It will be recalled that if the vendor fails to include in the note a statement that
it is so secured he is liable to the purchaser for damages-.e., for the amount he is
required to pay a holder without notice.
As to Oregon, see note 5x supra; as to South Dakota, see note 65 infra.
"Infancy is a defense against a holder in due course. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-305.
" Cf. the South Dakota statute, supra note 53, expressly declaring the note non-
negotiable. In Oregon, presumably the note would remain negotiable in the sense that
other defenses would be cut off, but this is academic since the statute affords a plenary
defense.
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it is for purchase-money, the purchaser can recoup from the vendor the
deficiency he must pay to the holder.
This is fairly drastic handling for a type of transaction which on the
surface appears to be a fairly innocuous one. Before we inquire, how-
ever, why the legislature should be so antipathetic to vendors who
finance their own purchasers, let us inquire into the economic effect of
such a statute.
Given certain assumptions, the statute, drastic though it may sound,
may have negligible effect. If vendors who take purchase-money mort-
gages to secure payment of the purchase price do not rely on the
personal credit of the purchaser, but solely on the security, and if, con-
sistently with this attitude, they require a down payment sufficient to
insure the adequacy of the security despite any foreseeable decline in
value, then the absence of the right to a deficiency judgment should be
of little interest to them, and the statute should not appreciably affect
their business practices. If, on the other hand, such financiers do rely
on the personal credit of the purchaser as a safeguard against an unfore-
seen decline in value, they may be expected to offset in some fashion
the loss of this advantage. In particular, if such financiers are willing
to accept lower down payments in relation to the value of the land
than others consider prudent, and if their willingness to do this is based
upon the personal obligation of the purchaser, they will change their
practice. They will require a higher down payment, or a higher price,
or a higher interest rate,66 to compensate them for the lost value of the
right to recover the deficiency. In general, assuming that the right to
the deficiency is a valuable one, the effect of the statute will be: (i) to
induce the vendor to resort, if he can, to some remedy other than fore-
closure and suit for deficiency; or (2) to induce the vendor to adopt
some form for the transaction other than that of a conveyance and pur-
chase-money mortgage, and not within the reach of the statute; or
(3) to induce the vendor to change his business practices in such a way
as to offset loss of the right to the deficiency. In the process of chang-
ing his business practices, it may be that he will lose such competitive
advantages as he may have had over other financiers, especially since
financiers other than vendors still enjoy the right to recover the defi-
In Dennis v. Moses, 18 Wash. 537 (1898), supra note 54, the mortgagor pur-
ported to waive the protections afforded by the statute, including the prohibition against
deficiency judgments, and the agreement recited that in consideration of this waiver, a
lower interest rate was charged than would otherwise have been required. Id. at 556.
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court observed that one of its effects would
be to raise interest rates. Id. at 557.
[Vol. i96o: z
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ciency Thus, a possible effect of the statute would be to discourage
financing by the vendor to such an extent that practically all real estate
financing would be done by others than the vendor-e.g., by banks,
savings and loan societies, insurance companies, or other financial
institutions.
A legislature determined to discourage vendor-financing would be
well advised to provide against the first two contingencies which have
been mentioned: that the vendor might seek a remedy, other than
foreclosure and suit for the deficiency, which would secure to him sub-
stantially the same benefits that were his under that remedy, or that
he might evade the statute by casting the transaction in another form.
The North Carolina legislature did not provide against these con-
tingencies. Suppose that Bullington, instead of exercising his power
of sale and suing for the deficiency, had simply sued Angel on the
notes in North Carolina. He would then have recovered a judgment
for the full amount of the unpaid balance, which could be satisfied by
execution upon Angel's North Carolina assets."8 The Oregon court
67 This was unqualifiedly true of the Oregon statute of 1903, which abolished pur-
chase-money deficiency judgments entirely, while leaving other mortgages unaffected.
With reference to the North Carolina statute, it must be noted that contemporaneous
legislation (N.C. Laws ch. 275 (1933)) required all mortgagees in effect to credit the
purchaser with the fair value of the property.
as 3 JONES op. cit. supra note 55, §§ x565, 1572 et seq. (8th ed. i9z8); Warren v.
Herrington, 171 N.C. 165, 88 S.E. 139 (1916) ; cf. Councill v. Bailey, X54 N.C. 54,
69 S.E. 76o (i9io). Whether or not this procedure gives the vendor the equivalent
of the right to foreclose and recover the deficiency, and entails the same evils against
which the statute were directed, is a complex question. If the judgment on the per-
sonal obligation is satisfied, the mortgage is, of course, discharged, and the purchaser
becomes the owner of the land. Thus, we do not have a basis for the characteristic
complaint against the purchase-money deficiency judgment, that the vendor "takes back
his land" and recovers the deficiency in addition. But whether the purchaser is any
better off because of this circumstance depends upon the value of the land. If the land
in Bulllngton v. 4ngel was not, in fact, worth more than the first mortgage, the advan-
tage to the purchaser in keeping it is dubious, even though he had acquired an apparent
"equity" of $soo by his down payment. The most that can be said is that if owner-
ship cannot in any case be considered a burden to him, he is better off than if there had
been foreclosure and deficiency judgment because of the possibility that the land may
be worth more than the first mortgage. If the judgment on the personal obligation is
not satisfied, the question becomes whether execution can be levied on the mortgaged
property, with or without the benefit of the mortgage lien, as well as on other assets of
the purchaser. If it can be levied on the mortgaged property with benefit of the lien,
the situation is indistinguishable from that under foreclosure and suit for deficiency:
the mortgaged property can be sold and other assets can be attached for the rest. If
the vendor may levy on the mortgaged land, but without benefit of the lien, he is worse
off to the extent that there are liens prior to his judgment, but the purchaser is no
better off. If the vendor may not levy on the mortgaged land, the most he can do is
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refused to hold that such a statute by implication precluded the mort-
gagee from electing to sue on the personal obligation.60 In California,
on the other hand, the mortgagee could not elect to sue on the personal
obligation; by virtue of statute, there was only one procedure for re-
covering a debt secured by mortgage, and that required exhaustion of
the security as a condition precedent to further recovery.70  When the
statute abolishing the right to deficiency judgments under purchase-
money mortgages was superimposed on this plan, the purchase-money
mortgagee was effectively limited to the security. In North Carolina,
this result could be reached only by a broad interpretation designed to
make the statute effective despite inadequate foresight in its drafting-
an interpretation such as was rejected by the majority of the Oregon
court.
The vendor-financier might also escape the incidence of such a statute
by resorting to the installment land contract instead of the conveyance
satisfy the judgment out of other assets, leaving the purchaser with ownership of the
land, as above. If the vendor must levy on other assets before resorting to the mort-
gaged land, the result will depend on the availability of other assets; if there are none,
the result will be the same as in the case of foreclosure and deficiency judgment. North
Carolina follows the general rule, 3 JONES, op. cit. supra at § 1587, that there may not
be execution on the mortgaged property, Warren v. Herrington, supra. However, in
Bullington v. Aisgel, that property was in Virginia. If Bullington had sued on the
debt in North Carolina, then foreclosed in Virginia, then levied on assets in North
Carolina to satisfy the judgment, it would have required considerable ingenuity to
defeat his scheme to avoid the statute. For this reason, as well as for the reason that
the purchaser may be no better off by virtue of being left with ownership of the prop-
erty, we shall proceed on the assumption that by suing on the debt the vendor obtains
substantially the equivalent of a deficiency judgment. He is certainly not limited to the
security.
"
9Page v. Ford, 65 Ore. 450, 131 Pac. 1013 (1913). By statute in Oregon, a suit
to foreclose could not be maintained during the pendency of an action at law for the
debt, "nor thereafter, unless judgment be given in such action that plaintiff recover such
debt or some part thereof, and an execution thereon against the property of the defendant
in the judgment is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part." Id. at 456, 131 Pac. at
,015-16. See also Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. x, 9, 184 Pac. 740 (19). For the
view that the statute should be construed as abrogating the right to recover judgment
on the personal obligation while retaining the security of the mortgage, see id. at 21-23,
x31 Pac. at 746-47 (concurring opinion)5 for the view that the right to sue on the
personal obligation, with waiver of the mortgage security, is not an adequate substitute
for the right to foreclose and recover the deficiency, see id. at z5, 131 Pac. at 747-48;
for the view that the statute should be read as abolishing the right to sue on the personal
obligation, and confining the mortgagee to the security, see id. at 44 et seg., 131 Pac. at
754 et seq. (concurring opinion).
"° CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 726i Winkleman v. Sides, 31 Cal. App. 2d 387, 4o6, 88
P.zd 147, 156 (1939). The South Dakota statute, supra note 53, prohibited suit on
the note. See Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, z5 N.W.zd 8 (1944),
discussed at note 155 infra.
[Vol. x96o: i
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and purchase-money mortgage. This is a form of transaction which
has traditionally afforded much less in the way of safeguards to the
purchaser than a mortgage.71 In North Carolina, as in other states, it
was possible for the vendor in such a transaction to sue for specific per-
formance, obtain a decree for the purchase price, enforce his vendor's
lien on the property, and recover any deficiency by levying execution
on other property of the purchaser."2 While for some purposes North
Carolina had characterized such a proceeding as in substance one to
foreclose a mortgage,7 3 it would be a rather bold feat of construction
to hold the deficiency-judgment statute applicable to installment con-
tracts. At the legislative session following that in which its similar
statute was passed, California belatedly enacted an amendment extend-
ing it to the case of the purchaser who fails to complete his contract of
sale. 74  Thus, California sealed off both of the most obvious ways in
which vendor-financiers could evade the statute; the North Carolina
legislature left both open.75
This kind of draftsmanship, it must be confessed, casts some doubt
upon the hypothesis as to the legislative policy. We have tentatively
suggested that, since the purchase-money mortgage was singled out for
special and rather drastic treatment, the legislature was concerned about
the situation in which the vendor finances the sale, and was particularly
concerned for the protection of the purchaser in that situation. The
question may well be asked: If that was the purpose, why confine the
remedial statute to deficiency judgments when the mortgagee could
inflict substantially the same injury on the mortgagor simply by suing
on the personal obligation, and why confine it to purchase-money mort-
" See Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d i16, 208 P.zd 367 (i949) 5 Act, Recommendation
Study Relating to Installment Land Contracts, N.Y.L. REv. COMM'N REP. 343
(1937); Durfee, Foreclosure of Land Contracts in Michigan, 7 MICH. ST. B.J. 166
(1927); Hancock, Installment Contracts for the Purchase of Land in Nebraska, 38 NEB.
L. REV. 953 (1959)-
"7 Council v. Bailey, 154 N.C. 54, 69 S.E. 760 (9.2o). See also Morgan v. Lewis,
203 Ala. 47, 82 So. 7 (1919); Taft v. Reddy, 19i Wis. 144, 2io N.W. 364 (1926).
"7 Council v. Bailey, 154 N.C. 54, 69 S.E. 76o (ig9o) 5 Crawford v. Allen, 189
N.C. 434, 127 S.E. 522 (i935) 5 First Nat'l Bank of Johnson City v. Pearson, 219 N.C.
494, z6 S.E. 46 (1896); cf. Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 1 S.E. 462 (1887). See
Note, 12 N.C.L. REV. z84 ( 934).
'7 See note 53 supra.
"A third possibility of evasion-giving the purchaser a deed without taking a
mortgage back, and foreclosing the "vendor's lien" of British equity-was not available
in North Carolina, which recognizes no lien for purchase money in favor of the vendor
who has conveyed. Womble v. Battle, 38 N.C. i61 (3 Ired. 182) (1884). See also
Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., i5o N.C. 282, 288-89, 63 S.E. 1045, 1048
(1909).
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gages and thereby induce the vendor to resort to the relatively oppres-
sive land contract, through which he could still recover the equivalent
of a deficiency judgment? The only answer is simply that legislatures
do not always see the whole problem, and are not always astute to close
all the loopholes. The evidence is strong that the legislature wanted
to furnish protection to the purchaser where the vendor did the financ-
ing. The only alternative possibility is that there was something dis-
tasteful about the action to recover a deficiency under a purchase-money
mortgage, as an action, which was not shared by actions on personal
obligations, suits for specific performance, and actions to recover mort-
gage deficiencies brought by third-party mortgagees. This is manifestly
absurd.70 California's amendment of its statute to plug the installment-
contract loophole confirms the conclusion: the policy was one of pro-
tecting the purchaser where the vendor did the financing; the North
Carolina legislature simply did not do an efficient job of insuring the
effectiveness of the policy.
The third general effect of the statute is that it might require the
vendor-financier to change his terms and conditions of sale, perhaps
to such a point that such financing would be discouraged altogether, to
be replaced by third-party financing. It has been suggested that the
alternative of third-party financing opens an easy and obvious way for
"evasion" of the statute and the legislative poicy.77  But this assumes
that the legislative purpose was to protect the purchaser against a de-
ficiency judgment irrespective of who furnished the credit. It is true
that later in the same session the legislature provided for the relief of
mortgage debtors generally in connection with deficiency judgments;
but in this earlier statute, the legislature singled out the purchase-money
mortgage for special and drastic treatment. It may very well be that,
for reasons which do not yet appear, the legislature wished to discourage
the practice of financing by vendors, and to force a shift to financing by
third parties. If so, the substitution of a third party for the vendor as
financier would represent accomplishment rather than frustration of the
"8 Cf. Wright v. Wimberly, 94. Ore. 1, 45, z84 Pac. 740, 754 (19x9) : "The legisla-
ture did not look upon a suit in equity as an evil and an action at law as a virtue, for
each is only a form of procedure designed to accomplish a result." (Concurring opin-
ion.) Moreover, since the statute was prospective only, the courts of North Carolina
would continue indefinitely to entertain suits for deficiencies arising out of mortgages
executed prior to its enactment.
"' Hanft letter, supra note 61: ". . . [T]he statute is easy of evasion by the usual
device of obliging the buyer to borrow the purchase price from some other lender, pay
the money to seller, and give the mortgage to the lender. Therefore the statute is a
booby trap for the seller who is ill advised."
[Vol. x96o: t
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purpose. It is perhaps for this reason that another North Carolina
observer is reluctant to label as "evasion" the arrangement for third-
party financing.78
We are thus squarely confronted with the question as to why the
legislature was so hostile toward transactions in which the sale was
inanced by the vendor. In order to keep the problem in perspective,
however, it will be well, before exploring that question, to examine to
some extent the hostility toward deficiency judgments in general.
Iv
THE DEFICIENcY JUDGMENT IN GENERAL
The deficiency judgment was a relatively late development in the
law of mortgages, and is said to be entirely the creature of statute. 9
When foreclosure by sale was substituted for earlier methods, theo-
retically for the purpose of giving the mortgagor the benefit of any
excess in the value of the security over the amount of the debt, it was
thought that as a corollary the mortgagee should be entitled to recover
the amount by which the security failed to satisfy the debt.79a In times
of depression, however, the right of the mortgagee to recover the de-
ficiency, superficially a simple matter of equal treatment of the parties,
came to be regarded as "an instrument of oppression ' whereby "the
mortgagee may be treated to a windfall and the mortgagor made to pay
his debt twofold."80  This attitude is based upon the assumption that,
money being scarce and too much land being on the market, there is
almost no competitive bidding and the price realized upon the sale will
not reflect the "true" value of the property.8' Despite the analytical
difficulties involved in this reasoning,82 there is no denying that its
Marsh letter, satra note 6z.
"Friedman, supra note 48.
"" The statements in the text are based on the development of mortgage law in
America. In England, foreclosure by sale was developed in the interest of mortgagees,
as an alternative to the unsatisfactory procedure of cstric foreclosure. Tefft, The
Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 579-80 (1937). Moreover, while
the concomitant English law provided for a deficiency judgment, it did not give the
mortgagee an effective or practical remedy for reaching unmortgaged assets. Id. at 585,
86.
so Poteat, supra note 35, at 529.
a' Ibid.
"
2Suring State Bank v. Giese, z2o Wis. 489, 491, 246 N.W. 556, 557 0933). See
also Perlman, supra note 3x at 804. Generally, though not in North Carolina, there was
a substantial reason why the foreclosure sale would not reflect the actual market value:
Vol. x96o: i]
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appeal has induced legislatures to curb the right to the deficiency judg-
ment in order to prevent the creditor from "profiting unreasonably at
the expense of a helpless debtor."8 And, interestingly enough, there
has been little protest from detached observers or even from the creditor
interests who are "adversely" affected by such legislation.84
The Model Power of Sale Mortgage Foreclosure Act8" provides
in section ten that "Foreclosure under the provisions of this act shall
fully satisfy the obligation secured by the mortgage foreclosed, regard-
less of the sale price or fair value, and no deficiency decree or other
judgment shall thereafter be obtained on such obligation." In the
discussions which led to this draft, Nathan William MacChesney,
General Counsel of the National Association of Real Estate Boards,
said:86
the statutory right to redeem after foreclosure discouraged bidding. North Carolina
had, and has, no statutory period of redemption.
For a graphic account of the effect of market paralysis on mortgage foreclosures,
see Federal Title and Mortgage Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N.J. Eq. zoo (933).
83 Farage, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments and Their Constitutionality, 41 DIcK. L.
REV. 67, 70 (x937).
, Mild disapproval is expressed in Stanley, supra note 48, and a British comment
appears to assume the nonexistence of the problem: "If, where the borrower has other
assets, the lender takes action on the covenant for the deficiency after sale it is not
generally regarded as an undue hardship to the borrower, as the loan has not yet been
repaid." Turner, The English Mortgage of Land as a Security, zo VA. L. REV. 729
(1934). The only vigorous protest which we have received in a sampling of opinion
is one from Horace Russell, Esq., General Counsel, United States Savings and Loan
League, Chicago, in a letter dated February z, 1959: "We are of the opinion that
anti-deficiency judgment laws are unconstitutional, bad public policy, and injurious to
the very people intended to be benefited by them, and that the same have been passed
from time to time purely for political purposes.... To abolish deficiency judgments in
mortgage loan transactions would have the effect of depriving individuals of the value
of good character and good credit in connection with such transactions."
In 1937, the California Legislature by joint resolution requested advice from federal
lending agencies as to whether the enactment of legislation abolishing the right to a
deficiency judgment upon foreclosure would hamper lending to Californians. Cal. Stats.
2741 (1937). (Note that the inquiry did not relate to deficiencies on purchase-money
mortgages5 the California statute abolishing the deficiency judgment in such cases had
been passed in 1933.) The Board of the HOLC replied through its general counsel
that "such deficiency judgment legislation as you refer to is unwise public policy, puts
obstacles in the way of the family deciding to acquire a home, and should be avoided.
* . ." See Poteat, supra note 35, at 532-33 n. 93. In the Board's view, the only evil
associated with deficiency judgments related to sales for nominal bids, and existing
legislation requiring that the fair value of the security be credited was adequate.
5 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1940).
S"National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Transcript of
Proceedings (relating to Uniform Short Form Mortgage Act and Uniform Mortgage
Foreclosure Act), 4 9th Annual Conference, San Francisco, July 3-8, x919, pp. 6x-6z.
[Vol. x96o: i.
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There is a very substantial opinion in this country that the deficiency decree
is economically wrong and socially undesirable and somehow we should do
away with it, but the consensus of opinion based upon that debate was that
if there is an ascertainment of the value, it should be based upon normal con-
ditions and not upon present fair market values at the time that the action is
taken, which would make a very great difference in the question of deficiency
judgment ....
Somehow in this country we have got to work out the theory of deficiency
decrees ... because this country cannot afford to go through another depres-
sion with the wiping out of equity values such as we have witnessed during
the last ten years.
I would like to see the Committee . . .give further attention to the
question of deficiency decrees. As a matter of fact, in the borrowing of
money-and I represent almost wholly lenders of money and not bor-
rowers-in the borrowing of money, the lending institution has sources of
information as to values and so forth, greatly superior to the owner of the
property, and it would not be any great hardship and would tend to prevent
unwise and improvident loans if, as a matter of fact, the lender were limited
to the security of the property upon which he advances the money.
We know that while there is a good deal of talk about character loans,
there are very few character loans made. The loans, as a matter of fact, are
made on the property, and this question of deficiency decree is not taken into
consideration, and generally speaking, it catches only the unwary; the people
who have had experience in the past do not sign the paper and avoid the
personal responsibility which goes with it, so that it is rather the unsuspecting
who is caught in this trap.
William C. Prather, Associate Counsel of the United States Savings
and Loan League, has dismissed the apparent advantage to the lender
of the right to a deficiency judgment as largely illusory.8 7  In part, his
attitude is influenced by the obstacles which depression legislation has
placed in the way of the remedy8 8 in part, it is based on the fact that
such judgments are seldom satisfiedl 9 in part, it recognizes that the
mortgagor may justly complain that the sale price, at least in times of
depression, will not reflect the true value: "[T]he mortgagee's control
of the bid price at the sale was almost complete, meaning that almost
87 Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420, 4-37-39
(reprinted in United States Savings & Loan League, Legal Bulletin, May 1958).
"8 Guiliani (Peter Guiliani, counsel for the National Life Insurance Co.), Some
Legal Considerations, 61 U.S. INVESTOR 846, 848 (1950).
so Hoffman, Recent Legislation of Interest to Lawyers in General Practice, 46 ILL.
B.J. 20, 28 (1957): ".. . the general experience, that deficiency judgments are seldom
of any value." See also, CIARK & SHULMAN, LAW ADMIN5STPATION IN CONNECTICUT
123-24 (1937).
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the entire amount of the debt could be taken in the form of a deficiency
judgment. '90 He observes that, "In several states, Tennessee for one,
the right to deficiency judgment is seldom exercised, and many attor-
neys in Illinois have abandoned the practice except under extraordinary
circumstances."'" The deficiency judgment is listed as one of four
factors "tending most to confuse the issue and which are primarily re-
sponsible for a major part of the delay, trouble, and burdensome ex-
pense in foreclosure proceedings" 92 only seven per cent of the dollar
amount of deficiency judgments is ever realized; 93 in 99.3 per cent of
"public" sales, the mortgagee is the buyer.9 4 This spokesman for mort-
gagee interests recommended elimination of deficiency judgments: "Of
negligible value to the lender, they can be of incalculable damage to
the borrower." 5 He concluded:9"
While the deficiency judgment is one of the few advantages bestowed
upon the mortgagee, the statistics show clearly that the advantage is one of
theory only, the seven per cent listed as salvaged being hardly worth the
cost of carrying the total amounts on the books for a period of years and the
cost and time involved in sporadic efforts at collection. Furthermore, it can
hardly be an advantage to the mortgagee to drive the debtor into bankruptcy
as the result of a large deficiency judgment; in such cases the loss may be all
the mortgagee's.
Similar sentiments have been expressed by others; it is said that defi-
ciency judgments are practically worthless against even solvent debtors9 7
and that the principal reason for a deficiency judgment in Illinois in
1933 was that it provided a basis for the appointment of a receiver who
could take immediate possession and collect the rents and profits during
the redemption period.9" A textbook bearing the imprimatur of the
American Institute of Banking says: "Because of the innumerable cases
in which mortgagees have bid in the property at a fraction of its true
value and the mortgagors have been left owing part of the debt which
was secured by the property, some states have enacted laws restricting
the right to obtain deficiency judgments under certain circumstances
and imposing requirements for the protection of the debtor." 9 Un-
derstandably, the mortgage debtor who loses his property and who in
'
0 Prather, supra note 87, at 438. 91ld. at 439. '2 Id. at 452.
98 Ibid. 9' Ibid. o Id. at 453. "5Id. at 454.
"'Carey, Brabner-Smith & Sullivan, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County: 1,
Foreclosure Methods and Redemption, 27 ILL. L. REV. 595, 61z (1933).
"' Id. at n. 5. See also Brabner-Smith, Economic A4spects of the Deficiency Judg-
ment, 2o VA. L. REv. 719 (1934).
" AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING, HOME MOITAGE FINANCING 66 (1938).
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addition is saddled with a deficiency judgment is bitter and rebellious,
and resists payment to the utmost. 100
Not all of this information concerning the deficiency judgment was
available in 1933. But much of it was, and, in a situation in which
President Hoover's belief, that the practices of mortgagors with respect
to foreclosures were "utterly destructive of the interest of debtor and
creditor alike," was shared by many mortgage creditors, the action
taken by North Carolina to relieve against deficiency judgments gen-
erally is quite understandable. 10 1 The deficiency judgment being of
relatively little value to the mortgagee and very offensive and burden-
some to the mortgagori the mortgagor being regarded as unjustly im-
poverished and the mortgagee as unjustly enriched; the true value of
the land being thought to be greater than the price realized at the sale;
and the deficiency judgment being a "sore spot" 02 in a process of debt
liquidation which threatened the peace and economic stability of the
community, North Carolina modified the right to obtain deficiency
judgments, and made the modification applicable to existing mortgages.
While the same considerations probably influenced the special action
taken prospectively with regard to deficiencies under purchase-money
mortgages, they do not fully explain that action.
V
THE PURCHASE-MONEY MORTGAGE
At the outset of the inquiry into the special reasons which led the
North Carolina legislature to abolish deficiency judgments entirely with
respect to purchase-money mortgages, it is interesting to note that at an
earlier date, legislation for relief against deficiencies gave the opposite
treatment to such mortgages; apparently they were regarded as espe-
cially deserving claims. An Arkansas statute of 1879103 established an
appraisal procedure, and provided that if the price bid at the fore-
closure sale was less than two-thirds of the appraised value there should
be a resale after a lapse of time. A proviso was inserted to the effect
that "this act shall not apply to sales of property for the purchase
... See Brabner-Smith, Economic 4spects of the Deficiency Judgment, 20 VA. L. REV.
719, 722-23 (1934).
.0. See Carey, Brabner-Smith & Sullivan, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County:
II, Foreclosure Methods and Redemption, 27 ILL. L. REv. 595, 849-50 0933).
.o "The evident purpose of the Legislature was to relieve a present condition by
applying the poultice of the act to the sore spot of deficiency judgments in foreclosures
of mortgages, caused by decline in realty values." Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 64z,
650, 656, 6x S.W.2d 686, 690, 692 (1933).
'"o Ark. Laws 94 (1879). See Robards v. Brown, 4o Ark. 423 (1883).
VCol. ig6o: i]
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money thereof." The priority given to purchase-money mortgages (in
the broader sense) over other liens may also be borne in mind, though
that concerns the relation between the mortgagee and other claimants,
not that between the mortgagee and the mortgagor; besides, the courts
have gone out of their way to explain that priority as being based
on conceptual grounds, rather than on any supposed equity in the
mortgagee. 04
Two distinguishing features which might account for the special
treatment given by the North Carolina legislature to purchase-money
mortgages are at once apparent. First, when such a mortgage is fore-
dosed, the mortgagee, if he is the bidder (as he usually is), gets back
the very land which was his before the original sale; in addition, he
keeps whatever payments the purchaser may have made. If we are
somewhat inattentive to the question of who bears, or should bear, the
risk of a decline in the value of the property-as the popular mind is
likely to be-it is easy to see the argument that the mortgagee has
been made whole by being restored to his original condition, with com-
pensation (by way of the installment payments) for the use of the
property in the meantime. By a similar process of reasoning, it may be
argued that the mortgagee, having as vendor sold the property for the
price agreed upon, is somehow estopped to deny that it was worth the
full amount of the debt. If the problem is not that of a real decline in
the value of the property, but of the failure of the foreclosure sale to
produce a bid resembling the true value, then the feeling that the
mortgagee has taken undue advantage and is being unjustly enriched
is likely to be particularly intense against the vendor who takes back
his own and demands a judgment for the deficiency in addition.
Second, the vendor-mortgagee has not parted with any cash; he has
merely set his price-perhaps at a figure higher than the value of the
land, but that is not necessary to the argument-specified the down
payment required, and taken the purchaser's obligation for the balance.
It can be said of him that he is not lending money but trading-or even
"speculating"l°--in land.
To be contrasted is the position of the third-party financier--say, a
bank or building and loan association or insurance company. It has
nothing to do with fixing the price; it makes no representations as to
value, except such as might be implied from the limit it sets on the
lot I JONES, op. cit. supra note 55, § 584; Moring v. Dickerson, 85 N.C. 466, 47z
(1ss8).
*5 Cf. the quotation, supra note 57.
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amount of the loan; it is not particularly interested in promoting the
sale of the land; when it buys at the foreclosure sale, it is not taking
back something apparently commensurate in value with what it turned
over to the mortgagor. It loaned money in cash, and has not been
repaid (except to the extent that the true value of the land exceeds the
price on the foreclosure sale). As one North Carolina observer has
commented: "... [The purchase-money mortgage] is a transaction in
an entirely different category from that of a voluntary lender in his
dealings with a voluntary borrower who has a legal and moral obliga-
tion of paying back the amount of the loan in kind."'0°  It is not easy
to argue that, as between the third-party lender and the purchaser, the
risk of a real decline in value should be borne by the former; it is much
easier to make such an argument against the vendor-financier. "Prior
to the sale [the vendor] owns the property outright, he can sell on
any terms that he wishes, he can require a purchaser to make an adequate
downpayment. If he contemplates that there may be a default with
a necessity for a foreclosure, he can protect himself by requiring a suffi-
cient downpayment to save him from loss."'1 7  Moreover, he "has first
claim on the property which he has sold, and in case of default he can
get it back by going through the usual legal process of foreclosure.' 0 8
In construing the similar California statute, the California Supreme
Court has said: "The one taking such a trust deed [i.e., a vendor taking
a purchase-money mortgage] knows the value of his security and
assumes the risk that it may become inadequate." 0 9 A commentator
has enlarged upon this as follows: "The rationale for thus singling out
the purchase money creditor and thus prohibiting him from obtaining
a deficiency judgment is said to be that he is in a special position to
know the value of his security and should, therefore, assume at least
part of the risk that it may become inadequate.""'  This is not a par-
ticularly convincing explanation of the legislative purpose. Without
knowledge as to who vendor-financiers are, and who third-party lenders
are, it is, of course, impossible to speak with any kind of accuracy as to
their relative positions with respect to knowledge of the value of the
security; but the proposition that the average vendor of real estate is
... Marsh letter, supra note 61. (Emphasis added.)
10. Ruff letter, supra note 6Y.
l 1o Marsh letter, supra note 6i. (Emphasis added.)
S"5 Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 97, 259 P.2d 425, 427 (953).
11o Comment, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 19z, 195 (1956). "This rationale does not
appear to apply where the purchase money mortgagee is not the vendor of the property."
Id. at 195 n. 14.
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in better position to know its value as security than the average lending
institution, or even private investor, is an implausible one. Lending
institutions, at least, have at their command appraisal facilities and in-
formation as to market trends which are not easily accessible to the
average property-owner who applies to them for a mortgage loan."'
It would be enormously helpful in ascertaining the legislative policy
if we could know who those vendors are who finance land sales by means
of purchase-money mortgages; in what situations the transaction takes
this form, rather than that of a loan by a third party; and why it takes
this form. If we knew these things it might be possible to identify the
type of transaction, and the features of the transaction, which aroused
the legislature's desire to discourage it and protect the purchaser. We
do not know these things. We have been unable to find any study
analyzing the sources of mortgage financing in these terms, or the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of the situation in which the vendor finances,
or the reasons for his doing so. There are occasional explanations
given for the choice of this form of transaction, but little in the way of
factual data is available. We can only attempt to reconstruct by de-
duction the transaction visualized by the legislature, utilizing such bits
of information as are available.
An obvious reason for the vendor's taking a purchase-money mort-
gage is simply that he may find the investment opportunity attrac-
tive.11 2 This, without more, is hardly a reason why the legislature
should discourage such transactions. Another reason is that by taking
the purchase price in installments rather than in cash he may effect an
income-tax saving."' This is a motive which can be put aside for pur-
poses of the present inquiry. There is no reason to suppose the legis-
lature desired to discourage such tax savings; the act does not apply to
installment land contracts, in which the same kind of saving is possible;
and above all, income tax considerations did not enter into the trans-
actions which led Oregon in 19o3 to abolish deficiency judgments on
purchase-money mortgages.
A priori, it may be assumed that vendors of land are not typically
in the business of selling credit, and are not typically in position to do
"' See supra note 86.
.1. MACCHESNEY, op. cit. supra note 55, at 676.
113 Ibid. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §453; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION &
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION; ACCOUNTING
PERIODS AND ACCOUNTING METHODS (x950); Young, Tax Consequences of Real
Estate Financing, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 36o ; Jenks, How. to Make Effective Use of Install-
ment and Other Sales Mechanics to Reduce Taxes, 6 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 467 (1948).
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so." 4 On this assumption, the extension of credit by the vendor would
be an arrangement resorted to when the necessary credit cannot be
obtained from a more normal source." 5 If credit is not available from
an institution in the business of making loans on real estate, it must be
because the terms of the transaction are not acceptable to the lending
institution."' Specifically, the likelihood is that the purchaser is unable
to make a down payment sufficient to satisfy the agency's loan-value
ratio standards. Thus, if the price agreed on by the parties and the
appraised value is $ioooo, and the lending agency is willing to advance
no more than sixty per cent of the appraised value, and the purchaser
can pay only $2,ooo in cash, there is an obstacle to consummation of
the sale which the vendor may overcome by financing it himself-
adjusting the terms in such a way as to compensate himself for the risk
that the security is inadequate, as by charging relatively high interest,
or increasing the price. Implicit in such a transaction is an assumption
that the arrangement is unsound, viewed as a secured transaction, since,
according to the conservative practices of the lending agency, the se-
curity is insufficient. Hence, whatever may be said with respect to the
ordinary practice of mortgage lenders, 1 7 it is probable that the vendor
in such a transaction does rely to some extent upon the personal obliga-
.
1 See CASE, MODERN REAL ESTATE PRACTICE z8i, 284. (1956). This statement
is subject to the important qualification discussed-infra at note 130.
... But see BINGHAM & ANDREWS, REAL ESTATE FINANCING 36 (1924): "The usual
and customary plan of purchasing real estate, other than lots in a sub-division, is by
the payment of part cash and the execution and delivery by the purchaser to the seller
of his note or notes for the balance, secured by a purchase-money mortgage on the
land." (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to believe that this is true, or ever was in
this century. Cf. NORTH, VAN BUREN, & SMITH, REAL ESTATE FINANCING 78 (.928);
FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS 64 (195i) ; Havighurst & Lawrence, Forfei-
tures under Real Estate Contracts in Illinois, 29 ILL. L. REV. 714 (935).
"1a Or, what amounts to the same thing, the institution may be prohibited by law
from making loans on such terms.
"" Cf. the quotation, supra note 86. Horace Russell, General Counsel of the United
States Savings and Loan League, strongly maintains that mortgage loans generally are
based on the personal responsibility of the borrower as well as on the security. Russell
letter, supra note 61. Mr. Carlyle McDowell, Vice President of the Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., Winston-Salem, says: "It has been my experience that most sellers do not
investigate the credit very carefully nor are many sales made on the strength of the
credit when purchase-money mortgages are used for financing." McDowell letter,
supra note 61. Cf. SKILTON, GOVERNMENT AND THE MORTGAGE DEBTOR 128-29
(1944). The short answer to this question would appear to be that as the adequacy of
the security decreases, the knowing lender relies increasingly on the personal credit of
the borrower, or else takes other steps to compensate himself for the risk of loss. This
suggests (although it is not a necessary inference) that loans on inadequate security tend
to be usurious. At least if an adequately secured loan is available only at the maximum
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tion of the purchaser.18  A fortiori, if the price agreed upon is in
excess of the appraised value, and if the property is of a type in which
ordinary lending agencies do not like to invest, the probability of
financing by the vendor is increased. Thus, in a time of speculation in
unimproved lots, there is little likelihood that any substantial credit
would be available from normal sources, and something like the pur-
chase-money mortgage may come into common use.119
The assumption that the phenomenon of vendor-financing is likely
to occur when more conventional sources of credit are not available is
borne out by the history of the installment land contract. It is said that
this form of transaction did not come into common use until late in the
nineteenth century, and that its principal use has been in connection
with the sale of vacant residential building sites and in financing sub-
divisions. 2 °  Emphasis has been placed upon the fact that this device,
by virtue of its superiority to the mortgage as a creditor's instrument,
enabled vendors to give early possession to purchasers without the means
legal rate, the lender without adequate security is likely to charge more than that rate)
and the vendor is in position to raise the rate indirectly by increasing the price. Cf.
CASE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 3o. See Riley v. District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. i957) i Dunham, Do "Hard Cases" Make Bad
Economics?, 4 How. L.J. 50 (.958).
Federal mortgage insurance has, of course, encouraged many loans on the basis of
security which would otherwise be inadequate, the lender relying on the insurance rather
than on the credit of the buyer. Since the borrower is liable to indemnify the govern-
ment, McKnight v. United States, z59 F.2d 540 ( 9th Cir. 1958), the end result, so
far as he is concerned, is the same as if, having bought on imprudent terms, he were
liable to a deficiency judgment.
18 "Second mortgage credit, in other words, is more like a personal loan." FISHER,
ADVANCED PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE PRACTICE 182 (1930).
1"But cf. 5 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 65 (1933): "The financing of land speculation is
carried on in large part by the same institutions which make possible investment in
land."
1 2 M ONCHOW, SEVENTY YEARS OF REAL ESTATE SUBDIVIDING IN THE REGION OF
CHICAGO 142 (1939)5 FISHER, ADVANCED PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE PRACrIcE 79-
8o, 191-92 (930); BINGHAM & ANDREWS, FINANCING REAL ESTATE 37, 178 (924)
("This method of acquiring real estate enables a person of small means to purchase a
lot for a home, for an investment or for speculation .... The chief occasion for the
use of the land contract in the sale of property is where the purchaser is able to pay
down only a small amount, not in excess of twenty per cent of the purchase price."
NORTH, VAN BUREN, & SMITH, FINANCING REAL ESTATE IIy 191-92, 245, 248, 26o-
6i (1928)i COLEAN, THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES 51-52 (i950) (pointing out that "Probably the greatest use of land
contracts in this country was in connection with the sale of public lands"-in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); FISHER, URBAN REAL ESTATE MARKETS 27-
28"(1951) 5 MCMICHAEL & O'KEEFE, How TO FINANCE REAL ESTATE 11-12 (zd ed.
1953) 5 Fegan, Tools of Real Estate Financing, 1957 U. ILL. L.F..3 3 5, 346,
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to make substantial down payments and, in the days before govern-
ment-insured mortgages, made it possible to buy land as well as con-
sumer durable goods on the installment plan, and so contributed to the
growth of American cities. :2'
Except where, for special reasons, no credit at all is available from
conventional sources, the vendor will not necessarily extend all the
credit. In almost all circumstances, a lending institution will be willing
to advance a conservative percentage of the appraised value on the
security of a first lien; and, on our assumption that the vendor is not
himself primarily interested in the investment opportunity, it follows
that the transaction will be financed so far as possible by a lending en-
terprise, and the vendor will merely furnish such credit as may be
necessary to close the gap between the down payment and the first
mortgage. In other words, it may be that the vendor-financier typi-
cally is engaged in junior-lien financing, and that purchase-money mort-
gages are typically second mortgages. There is some support for this
assumption in the literature. "Bridging the gap" between the first
mortgage and the down payment was referred to in the period pre-
ceding the enactment of the North Carolina statute as the "central
problem of real estate financing." '122 According to a more recent ac-
count, while the need for junior-lien financing has diminished, "Today
the purchase-money mortgage is the most common form of secondary
financing. -123
On the double assumption that the typical vendor-financier is not
in the business of extending credit and is usually a second mortgagee,
characteristics of the transaction which might arouse the legislature to
regulatory action begin to appear. Both amateur lending and junior-
lien financing involve practices which may lead to misfortune. The
amateur lender is likely to repeat the mistakes which characterized
mortgage financing before the rise of the modern lending institution,
and the second mortgagee is likely to aggravate those mistakes. Horace
Russell has listed eight such mistakes, of which the following are rele-
vant here:'
12" See supra note 120.
1 2 2 REEP, SECOND MORTGAGES AND LAND CONTRACTS IN REAL ESTATE FINANCING
1 (1928).
123 MCMIcHAEL & O'KEEFE, op. cit. supra note i2o, at 62-63. On the private
lender generally as a source of junior-lien financing, see NORTH, VAN BUREN, & SMITIJ,
op. cit. supra note Izo, at 29-30, 249, z6o-6i.
' RUSSELL, PRIVATE HOUSING LEGAL PROBLEMS, IN HOUSING, THE CONTINUING
PROBLEM, 41-42 (194:), quoted in COLEAN, op. cit. supra note 1zo, at 44-45.
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First was the general use of short-term mortgage loans, which had to be
refinanced every few years with high commissions and financing charges.
Second was the general practice of lending only a small amount on the
security of the first mortgage, which necessitated junior financing with all
the hazards to the borrower which that practice involved. Third was the
use of lump-sum rather than amortized mortgages, which necessitated the
borrower repaying the entire amount of the mortgage at one time or refi-
nancing it. Fourth was the prevailing high interest rates generally charged
on such loans. . . .Eighth was the absence of proper lending and appraisal
practices and procedure.
Moreover, the amateur lender was likely to be difficult about refinanc-
ing, and in general unlikely to indulge in the "calculated leniency"
which might be expected of responsible professional lenders. 25 The
legislature, as we know, was concerned about deficiency judgments gen-
erally. In the ordinary situation, the problem was that the foreclosure
sale did not realize the true value of the property at the time of sale.
With respect to purchase-money mortgages-considered as junior liens
negotiated by amateur lenders exercising the bargaining power of a
vendor-there was the additional problem of a foreseeable decline in
actual value rendering the security inadequate. It was dearly the
legislative policy to place the risk of such a decline on the vendor.
Moreover, apart from any decline in value, the security might be in-
adequate simply because the land was overpriced, in which case also
the vendor was to be required to take the loss. The purchase-money
mortgage was viewed as an improvident transaction5 in order to dis-
courage it, and protect the purchaser against his improvident bargain,
the vendor was to be limited to his security.'26
... Prather, supra note 87, at 425. See also NORTH, VAN BUREN, & SMITH, op. Cit.
supra note 12o, at 80-82. On the importance of amortization, see also COLEAN, URBAN
REAL ESTATE MARKETS 20 (1951) i REEP, op. cit. supra note xz2, at 90 (1928)3
BINOHAM & ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 12o at 132.
128 Considering ch. 36 in the light of ch. 275, a commentator concluded that "the
purchase-money mortgage statute was designed to discourage prospective purchasers
from buying land on small cash margins." Comment, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197-
98 (1946). "In general it is my opinion that the legislation you refer to was enacted
basically to protect a purchaser from a transaction in which the seller has made a rather
severe bargain with the purchaser. . . . In my opinion, the occasion for the legislation
was the over-reaching capriciousness of the seller." Ruff letter, supra note 61.
That current national policy encourages the purchase of real estate on small cash
margins, see supra note 117, does not militate against this interpretation of North
Carolina policy in 1933.
The brief for Dr. Angel in the Court of Appeals contains the following passage:
The District Court permitted a recovery in the amount of $3,oo.oo with interest
thereon at six per cent from the 5th day of March, 1940, which added to the
[Vol. 196o: t
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If this is a reasonably accurate reproduction of the legislature's
image of the purchase-money mortgage, there is one situation in particu-
lar in which the purchase-money mortgagee should be denied all relief:
The vendor having taken a second mortgage to "close the gap," the
third party who furnished the principal credit forecloses his first mort-
gage, exhausting the security. Such a transaction involves both of the
assumed evils of the purchase-money mortgage: amateur lending and
junior-lien financingi and the exhaustion of the security is precisely the
risk which the vendor should bear according to the legislative policy.
Yet not one of the statutes abolishing deficiency judgments on purchase-
money mortgages is aptly worded to accomplish this result. All speak
in terms of the deficiency remaining after foreclosure of the purchase-
money mortgage; they do not forbid suit on the personal obligation
without foreclosure. California, however, consistently with the view
that the purpose of the statute was to confine this type of mortgagee to
the security, managed to construe its statute as precluding recovery in
this situation.12 7  The situation in which foreclosure of the first mort-
gage exhausted the security of the second had been an exception to the
rule in that state that foreclosure is the mortgagee's only remedy. How
North Carolina would decide this question we cannot tell. The Cali-
fornia result is obviously necessary in order to effectuate the purpose of
the statute; yet we have already noted indications that in the situation
in which the vendor is the only mortgagee, North Carolina might allow
suit on the personal obligation.2 8 If, in addition, it would allow suit
on the personal obligation under a junior purchase-money mortgage
cash payment would give the appellee, the seller, $3,600.00 and his interest for
the use of the property for a period of one month. To prevent such injustices
and in order that one party might not unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another, who was so unfortunate as to be unable to meet his obligations when
apprised of his erroneous judgment in agreeing to pay an un'warranted price for
a given piece of property doubtless prompted the legislature of North Carolina to
enact Chapter 36 of the Public Laws of 1933 . . . , and thereby publish and
declare the public policy of the state. The legislature of North Carolina by
enacting the foregoing legislation and thereby declaring its public policy said to
the world that from and after the ratification of said Act that sellers of real estate
could not thereafter by foreclosure proceedings re-acquire their property and as a
further penalty demand "a pound of flesh."
Brief for Appellant 5-6, Angel v. Bullington, 15o F.ad 679 (4th Cir., '945) (No.
531o). (Emphasis added.) "The effect of [the statute] is to limit the creditor to the
property conveyed, when for the purchase money, changing in that respect the present
statute." A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in '933, ii N.C. L. REv.
591, 219 (933).
""Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
"" See text following note 70 supra.
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where foreclosure of the first by a third party has exhausted the security,
this is further evidence of the imperfection of the statutory scheme. It
does not seem to us, however, to impair the conclusions which have
been reached as to what the legislative purpose was.
According to our argument, the North Carolina legislature visu-
alized the purchase-money mortgage as one given by an amateur lender,
either to furnish all the necessary credit or to provide junior-lien financ-
ing; in either case the security was likely to be inadequate, the terms
oppressive, and the consequences harsh. There is one major flaw in
this picture. When the statute was passed in i933, there had been
thousands of foreclosures, many of them by lending institutions. Nor-
mally the mortgagee was the purchaser at the sale. Lending institutions
not being-primarily, at least-in the business of managing real estate,
their problem was to dispose of the properties acquired by foreclosure,
It is hardly to be expected in normal times, much less in periods of
depression, that the sale of land can be accomplished without credit.
These institutions being in the business of lending money, it was to be
expected that they themselves would supply the credit necessary to
finance the disposition of the properties, rather than yield this business
to a competitor. In short, professional lending institutions perforce
became vendors, and, in their role as financiers, would as a matter of
course employ the purchase-money mortgage-not for junior-lien financ-
ing, but as the first and perhaps the only mortgage. In this situation,
there were few, if any, of the evils attendant upon the purchase-money
mortgage transaction as we have visualized it. This is not amateur
lending; it is not junior-lien financingi the security is not likely to be
inadequate; the terms are not likely to be oppressive; the vendor's
bargaining position is weaker than in the usual situation, because of the
pressure to dispose of the property. North Carolina could have had
no conceivable reason to discourage the orderly disposition of foreclosed
properties in this manner. The ideal that has always dominated
American land policy, including land credit policy, is the ideal of owner-
ship by individuals and by the enterprises which make the land pro-
ductive;129 extensive ownership by financial institutions, with occupants
and producers reduced to the condition of tenants, is not the sort of
thing a state legislature is likely to contemplate with equanimity.
The disposition of foreclosed properties in this manner by financial
institutions is not imaginary; at least in other states, millions of dollars'
Igo See COLEAN, THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN TiE
UNITED STATES 7 (.950).
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worth of property was sold by such institutions during the depression on
the basis of purchase-money mortgages.13 Whether the anti-deficiency
judgment statute discouraged such dispositions in North Carolina we
do not know. It would tend to do so if, but only if, purchasers of the
foreclosed property were unable to make down payments sufficient to
satisfy conservative loan-value ratio standards. 180 a
We are thus again confronted with the question whether our hy-
pothesis as to the legislative policy must be abandoned when we en-
counter evidence that the statute is ineffective to accomplish the assumed
purpose or that the statute might have effects that were probably not
intended. Again, our answer is no. The fact that large holdings of
foreclosed property were disposed of by lending institutions on the basis
of purchase-money mortgages certainly shows that the image of the
purchase-money mortgage transaction previously constructed is an in-
accurate or incomplete onei it does not show that that image was not
the one in the minds of the legislators. We must still do our best to
discover what the legislature had in mind, and we can only suppose that
the possible effect of the statute on the disposition of foreclosed property
by lending institutions was not considered.
There is one thing more. When the case of Mr. Bullington and
Dr. Angel reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, counsel for the purchaser made the following argument:"1
In all probability one of the motives prompting the legislature in adopting its
public policy as set forth in said statute was due to the unwarranted specula-
tion and gambling era on the sale and purchase of real estate starting in the
State of Florida, perhaps about the year 1925, and reaching Western North
Carolina soon thereafter, and finally winding up in the financial destruction
of a large per cent of the land owners of Western North Carolina.
Immediately following the era of real estate speculation, foreclosures started,
... See LINTNER, MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS IN THE SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE MAR-
KETS 226 et seg. (194.8). For tables showing the loss and reforeclosure experience with
such mortgages, see id. at 512.
""Available information concerning the situation in North Carolina indicates that
the purchase-money deed of trust was used in the disposition of foreclosed properties,
and that the statute did not present an obstacle to the practice because the lending in-
stitutions, as a matter of established policy, did not seek deficiency judgments either in
connection with such transactions or with ordinary mortgages for investment. Letter
dated September x6, 1959, from Mr. Claude Currie, President, Security Savings & Loan
Association, Durham; letter dated October i, z959, from W. F. Conrad, Esq., Assistant
Counsel, Law Department, Mortgage Investment Section, The Prudential Insurance Co.
of America, Newark, N.J.
"" Brief for Appellant, Angel v. Bullington, ixo F.zd 679 ( 4 th Cir., z9€5) (No.
5310).
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deficiency judgments were being asked by non-resident speculators in real
estate, failures and suicides multiplied, and thereupon the legislature of North
Carolina declared its public policy in no uncertain terms by the passage of the
foregoing statute which thereafter prohibited the seller from demanding his
"pound of flesh". If the statute had been passed a few years earlier specula-
tors would have been stopped when they received back what they had sold,
homes would have been saved and perhaps lives would have been saved. The
foregoing would be the legislative history in connection with the passage of
Chapter 36, Public Laws 1933, if access were available to the committee
hearings and debates which took place in the legislature in connection with its
passage.
We have been unable to find confirmation of this theory of the
statute's purpose, although standing alone, the contemporary opinion
of members of the local bar is entitled to respect. Confirmation would
be furnished by evidence that the purchase-money mortgage was em-
ployed as an instrument of finance in the Florida land boom. We do
not know that it was. A lay account of that debacle tells us that
"Charles Dickens could have depicted Martin Chuzzlewit buying a lot
in a Florida 'development' in 1925, as readily and in the same language
as he did eighty-five years earlier."13 But Chuzzlewit's purchase of a
lot in the "city" of Eden was a cash transaction. 33 According to the
same account, the typical procedure was for the purchaser to deposit ten
per cent of the price, whereupon he received a "binder," or option to
purchase. He then hoped to transfer the option at a profit, especially
because he usually did not have the cash to make the first payment of
one-fourth of the purchase price, due within thirty days from the date
of the option.' 4 This does not sound like a purchase-money mortgage
transaction. On the contrary, it sounds remarkably like the "canal
terms" which had figured in the Chicago speculation of 1836.13 In
short, boom business seems to have been transacted by means of the
installment land contract5 if that was the kind of transaction which
prompted the legislature to act, it is strange that the statute dealt with
purchase-money mortgages and not with installment contracts. 80
..
2 SAKOLSKI, THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE 338 (1932).
... icIKENs, MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT ch. XXI (1840).
1" SAKOLSKI, op. Cit. supra note 132, at 339-
... MONCHOW, op. Cit.: supra note 12o, at 143; SAKOLSKI, op. Cit. supra note 132,
at 249. The terms, prescribed by the legislature, were: "... one fourth of the pur-
chase money to be paid in advance at the time of purchase, and notes taken for the
payment of the residue in three equal annual installments, bearing an interest of six
per cent per annum," with summary forfeiture upon default. Ill. Laws 145, 151
(1835-36).
118 We are indebted to George H. Ward, Esq., of Ward & Bennett, Asheville, N. C.,
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HeinOnline  -- 1960 Duke L.J. 40 1960
CONFLICT OF LA4WS
VI
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE TO CASES HAVING FOREIGN ASPECTS
We have arrived, not without doubts and difficulties, at a working
hypothesis as to the policy adopted by the North Carolina legislature.
The transaction in which the vendor supplied the credit necessary to
finance the sale was viewed with disfavor. The legislature acted to
modify the legal relations between the parties to such a transaction in
such a way that the vendor must look solely to the security for his satis-
faction, and could not rely on the personal responsibility of the pur-
chaser. The parties might arrive at the same result by negotiation; it
was perfectly possible for the mortgage not to contain a covenant to
pay the price, or for the purchaser to sign no notes, or for the mort-
gage to contain an express stipulation against personal liability. The
purchaser, in the view the legislature took of the matter, could not be
relied upon to protect himself in such ways. This, we suggest, was not
so much because of his inferior bargaining position-i'7 there being no
for calling our attention to the fact that, early in the depression, Florida enacted a
statute curbing the right to deficiency judgments under purchase-money mortgages.
The statute that he apparently has in mind provided:
In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages heretofore or hereafter executed
the entry of a deficiency decree for any portion of a deficiency, should one exist,
shall be within the sound judicial discretion of the court, but the complainant
shall also have the right to sue at common law to recover such deficiency, pro-
vided no suit at law to recover such deficiency shall be maintained against the
original mortgagor or mortgagors in cases where the mortgage is for the pur-
chase price of the property involved and where the original mortgagee becomes
the purchaser thereof at foreclosure sale and also is granted a deficiency decree
against the original mortgagor, or mortgagors.
Fla. Laws izi (19z9). Mr. Ward, who was of counsel for the defendant in Bulling-
ton v. Angel, suggests that the North Carolina statute was patterned on the Florida
one. Since the Florida statute seems much more limited in scope, we adhere, with
deference, to our view that the Oregon statute is the more probable model. In addition,
Mr. Ward describes in some detail the land boom in Western North Carolina in the
twenties, indicating that the mechanics were the same as those suggested in connection
with Florida: rapid turnover of options, or "binders," at inflated prices. Letter dated
August 26, 1959.
The Florida statute was involved in Battle v. Battjes, 274 Mich. 267, z64 N.W.
367 (1936).
Another North Carolina observer also attributes the statute to the real estate boom
and states that boom transactions were financed by the purchaser's paying a small portion
of the price in cash and giving a deed of trust to secure the balance. Letter dated Sep-
tember x6, z959, from Mr. Claude Currie, President, Security Savings & Loan Ass'n,
Durham. This interpretation does not entirely explain the timing of the statute's en-
actni~nt with reference to the boom period, nor its prospective operation, nor the simul-
taneous enactment of similar statutes in California, Montana, and South Dakota. See
note 53 supra.
"" Cf. Farage, supra note 83, at 71-72.
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basis for assuming, a priori, that vendors are in a stronger position than
purchasers-as it was because of the fact that many purchasers would
be unaware of the extent of their liability, or would not foresee the
eventuality of collapse and default, and would not bargain over the
matter at all. Therefore, the legislature placed a limitation on the
general principle of freedom of contract. It disabled the purchaser in
such a transaction to obligate himself for the price5 and, especially in
view of the assertibility of the defense against a transferee of the obliga-
tion, it is not unreasonable to liken the disability to that placed upon
an infant."38
Plainly, this was a policy for the benefit and protection of purchasers.
A right characteristic of the transaction, advantageous to the vendor,
was abolished, to the advantage of the purchaser. It may be suggested
that this begs the question: the North Carolina Supreme Court has said
that the statute only abrogated a remedy. But the question remains:
Why did it abrogate the remedy? And, as we have attempted to show,
it did so not because of concern with the court system, or the volume
and type of cases tried therein, but because of concern for purchasers.
The question becomes: With respect to cases involving foreign ele-
ments, in what circumstances does North Carolina have a legitimate
interest in the application of this protective policy? In what circum-
stances is there a reasonable basis for its application? When is the case
one within the scope of North Carolina's legitimate governmental con-
cern? Under what circumstances does the purchaser come within the
legitimate ambit of the North Carolina policy?
That the policy is not one for the protection of all purchasers every-
where, in all circumstances, and that the North Carolina legislature did
not care at all what happened in cases wholly domestic to Virginia, is
dear. On the assumption that states, like individuals, act primarily for
the furtherance of their own interests and the interests of their people,
we may reasonably state that the purchasers protected were:
(i) resident citizens of North Carolina;
(2) perhaps also nonresident citizens of North Carolina; and
(3) such other persons as may be entitled under the Constitution, or
on the basis of considerations of decency and far-sighted self-
interest, to equal treatment with local citizens.
The lawyer who is able to persuade a court that such a statute is
for the protection of purchasers, and that the interest of the state is
132 See supra note 6z.
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satisfied if, but only if, local purchasers are protected, may be reason-
ably assured that the court will probably apply the statute in such a
way as to effectuate the purpose and further the interest of the state,
or in such a way as to approximate that result. He cannot be wholly
sure of this. The court may be bemused by conflict-of-laws rules, and
insensitive to arguments based on policy and interest. Or, occasionally,
a court unsympathetic to the legislative policy may decide conflicts cases
in such a way as to frustrate it, and so reach what it deems a just result.
Basically, however, we believe that decisions in conflict-of-laws cases are
motivated by a desire on the part of the court to effectuate the policy
declared by local law-and, to the extent that the state has a legitimate
interest in the effectuation of its policy, this is exactly what courts should
do. When courts do not follow the rules of the Restatement, or when
they obviously manipulate those rules to justify a result based on other
considerations, or when they employ the broad rules and concepts of the
system in unpredictable ways, their behavior will usually be explainable
in these terms. It follows that the most reliable way of predicting the
decision of a court in such a case is by determining the policy of the
law and the extent of the interest, and that the most effective way of
persuading the court to reach the desired result is by making clear the
policy and the interest and showing how the result can be reached with-
out undue violence to the mechanics of the conflict-of-laws system.
The result in Bullington v. Angel, though not the precise form in
which it was cast, could have been predicted by such analysis. The
purpose of the statute was to protect purchasers; the purchaser was a
citizen and resident of North Carolina, obviously within the scope of
the protective policy. The decision of the court gave him the protection
of the statute. In order to accomplish this result, the court employed
a technique well established in conflict-of-laws cases: 39 Instead of
stating forthrightly that the statute was for the protection of North
Carolina purchasers, and would be invoked wherever necessary for their
protection, it treated the problem in conventional conflict-of-laws terms,
but in such a way as to accomplish approximately the purpose of the
statute by indirection. Probably the North Carolina court reasoned
that most actions against North Carolina residents for deficiencies
must be brought in North Carolina, and hence that applying the
statute to all actions in the local courts would substantially accomplish
.. Illustrative cases are Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 4.77, 78 Ad. 651 (1935),
and Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. zoz6 (1895), discussed in Currie, The
Constitution and the Transitory Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REV. 36 (1959).
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the legislative purpose, although such an application would logically
disclaim any interest in a North Carolina purchaser sued elsewhere, and
would occasionally give protection to foreign purchasers, in whom
North Carolina had no interest, when they happened to be sued in
North Carolina. An alternative solution of the same type would have
been to hold the statute applicable to all cases in which the land was
located in North Carolina, since most mortgagors of North Carolina
real estate are presumably local residents. 140  The court is much less
140A critic of the decision has suggested that the North Carolina legislature's policy
was directed "only against transactions involving North Carolina property," and that
"the rights of the parties should have been determined by the law of Virginia." Com-
ment, 13 U. CHi. L. REv. 195, 198 (1946). Further, that "Though the applicability
of the 'place of contracting' doctrine may be questionable under some circumstances, it
appears that in this case the reasonable expectations of the parties would be that the
law governing their transaction would be that of the state in which the notes were
executed and the property was situated." See also Note, 24 N.C.L. REV. 267, 269-70
(1946). This is strange reasoning. No basis whatever exists for attributing to the
legislature an intention to limit the effect of the statute to transactions affecting North
Carolina land, unless it be assumed (a) that the legislature believed it lacked power to
accomplish more fully its purpose, recognized by this critic, to protect purchasers, or
(b) that the legislature preferred this particular way of approximating its purpose to
that adopted by the court. The statement regarding the "reasonable expectation of the
parties" is a classic example of question-begging, characteristic of many arguments
concerning the conflict of laws. The expectation of the parties that the transaction will
be governed by the law of the place in which the notes were executed and the property
was situated is not a reasonable expectation unless it is, in fact, the law that that law
governs; the argument must be that the conflicts rule should point to the law of the situs
because the parties expect it to do so. This is, in fact, the more usual form of the
argument, see Note, 38 COLUM. L. REv. io49, i056 (1938), but it still begs the ques-
tion. The vendor may, indeed, assume that the law of the situs will govern; but if the
action must be brought in another state, which has an interest in applying its law for the
purchaser's protection, his expectation is ill founded, and not particularly reasonable.
He has simply not received adequate legal advice.
Assume for a moment that we were able to establish by recourse to committee re-
ports and legislative debates that the evil which gave rise to the statute was similar to
one that has been suggested (see note 131 supra) : Residents of North Carolina had been
speculating in the Florida land boom, buying Florida land and giving purchase-money
mortgages; after foreclosure, they were sued in North Carolina for the deficiency, with
the result that many of them lost their homes and farms. (This is not the evil de-
picted by counsel for Angel; they were suggesting that the Florida boom spread to
North Carolina land.) On this assumption, it is perfectly obvious that the purpose of
the legislature would be thwarted by a choice-of-law rule referring to the law of the
situs, or of the law of the place of contracting. It should be equally obvious that there
is no justification for a system for determining "what law governs" which ignores the
purposes of laws, as the traditional conflict-of-laws system does. Cf. Wood v. Wheeler,
xo6 N.C. 512, 1i S.E. 590 (18go), ii N.C. 231, 16 S.E. 418 (1892). If the pur-
pose of the legislation was what we have assumed in this note, the decision of the
North Carolina Supreme Court at least approximated its accomplishment, while a rule
referring to the law of the situs or of the place of contracting would have frustrated
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likely to make the place of contracting, or the place of performance,
the significant factor, since those elements are less likely to approximate
the desired protection to a satisfactory degree.
The reason for the indirection is twofold. In the first place, the
lexicon of conflict of laws is devoid of such terms as "the policy of the
law" and "the interest of the state in applying its policy" (except for
the term "loal public policy," which is by no means the same thing). 4 '
The system is territorially oriented; for the most part, it is concerned
with power over things and transactions, and the procedure in courts,
largely ignoring the fact that the dominant concern of law is with
people. In those instances in which it acknowledges the interest of a
state in people, it speaks only of the technical concept of domicile. In
the second place, a forthright statement that the legislature was con-
cerned with North Carolina purchasers would sound selfish and pro-
vincial, and would stir up troublesome problems of unconstitutional
discrimination. Actually, such a statement means only that the North
Carolina legislature was attempting to regulate only matters which
are within the sphere of its legitimate concern, and was not attempting
to impose disabilities on foreign purchasers, whose welfare is the con-
cern of their home states. But against the backdrop of the conventional
system of conflict of laws, which presents a facade of innocent impar-
tiality, the statement seems objectionable. Applying the statute to all
cases in the local courts, irrespective of who the parties may be, or
applying it to all cases involving local land, creates an illusion of even-
handed, impartial, nondiscriminatory justice, and of security against
attack on constitutional grounds. Actually, such techniques of indirec-
tion and approximation (i) weaken the case for the constitutionality
of the statute against attacks based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and (2) are increasingly likely to expose the statute to attacks by resi-
it; yet the books on conflict of laws give us nothing but rules such as that "the validity
and effect of a mortgage on land is determined by the law of the place where the land
is," RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 225 (1934), or that "the law of the place
of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise .... " Id. at § 332. Cf.
STUMBERG, CONFLIar OF LAvs 384 (2d ed. 1951); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 152 ( 3 d ed. 1949).
For a criticism, based on the policy of domestic law, of a case construing a domestic
mortgage moratorium as inapplicable to mortgages of foreign land ("The New York
state moratorium laws were intended for the benefit of the citizens of the state of New
York owning real estate in this state, and not for the benefit of real estate located
without the state." Harris v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 282 N.Y.S. 49 (.935)
(emphasis added)), see Note, 36 CoLum. L. REV. 487 (1936).
"' See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9, 28-
30 (1958).
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dents based on the Equal Protection Clause, and (3) are not necessary
in order to withstand attacks by nonresidents based on the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV or the Equal Protection Clause.
It is true that a forthright statement of the interest of the state in pro-
tecting its own purchasers would bring to light questions of discrimina-
tion long obscured by the pietism of conflict-of-laws law, and they are
not simple problems; but they ought to be brought to light and re-
solved, not swept under the rug by formulas which compromise state
policy.
Before amplifying these comments, we may note briefly how other
states have applied similar statutes abolishing the deficiency judgment
under purchase-money mortgages in cases involving foreign elements. 42
In McGirl v. Brewer,143 the Oregon court was called upon to de-
termine the applicability of the Oregon statute in a situation of exactly
the type presented by Bullington v. Angel: i.e., the land was located in
Montana; the contract was made and to be performed in Montana; the
vendor (presumably) was a resident of Montana' 14 4 and the purchasers
were residents of Oregon. After foreclosure in Montana by judicial
sale, the vendor sued in Oregon for the deficiency. The trial court
denied relief on the basis of the Oregon statute, and the Supreme Court
reversed. The opinion is a rambling affair. After quoting the state-
ment of the statute's purpose from its earlier decision in Wright v.
Wimberly,145 the court discussed local public policy, the rule that the
law of the place of contracting governs questions of validity, interpre-
tation, and construction, the rule that the law of the forum governs
the remedy, and the principles of comity5 then, suddenly, it announced
that, while each side had adduced valuable authority in support of its
'.We shall not include cases on anti-deficiency judgment legislation generally.
Although such "debtor relief" legislation was also for the protection and benefit of
mortgagors, its different purpose (to insure that the fair value of the security was
credited against the obligation) and the fact that it was applicable to mortgages in
force when it was enacted would require a different analysis. See infra note 164. Cf.
Comment, 13 U. CH. L. REV. 195, 197 n. 7 (1946). See also Comment, The Extra-
territorial Effect of Mortgage Moratoria, 40 CoLuM. L. REv. 867 (940); Bailey &
Rice, The Extraterritorial Effect of the New York Mortgage Moratorium, 20 CORNELL
L.Q. 315 (1935); Note, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 (1938) 5 Note, 36 COLUM. L. REv,
487 (1936); Comment, 7. CALIF. L. REv. 576 (1937); Note, 5o MICH. L. REV.
1097 (1952).
1,3 132 Ore. 422, z8o Pac. 508 (1929), reversal upheld on rehearing, 132 Ore. 432,
z85 Pac. 208 (930).
" If, instead, he was a resident of Oregon, the result reached by the court is even
more incongruous. See the discussion below.
145 94 Ore. 1, 584 Pac. 740 (1g9g). See note 52 supra.
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position, there was no confusion or uncertainty about the issue in the
case, quoting a passage from Corpus Juris146 to the effect that Cstatutes
of this nature do not apply where the mortgaged premises are situate in
another state." Of course, the quotation was not in point, the Oregon
statute being unique at the time; the quotation referred to statutes of
the type which provide that an action to foreclose shall be the only
remedy upon a debt secured by mortgage. On rehearing, the court
further discussed such matters as the lex fori and the lex loci contrac-
tus---"a branch of the law about which there is much contrariety of
opinion.' 47  Comity and public policy were also revisited. In the
end, the court adhered to its former opinion, holding the statute in-
applicable where the contract is made and the land is located in another
state. 48
It may be said that this law in a way operates to protect against purchases of
land which have proved improvident, in that they are thereby relieved in
many instances from contracts and obligations otherwise enforceable ...
However, the sister state of Montana has not such a law. The respondents
were liable upon their contracts for the amount thereof, without any such
modifying features. And, as we have seen, the parties made their contract in
the state of Montana, with reference to lands situate in said state, and such
obligations are controlled in their enforcement and application by the laws of
the state where executed.
The only possible defense of such a holding is that, while the Oregon
policy is to protect local debtors, the policy is not so strong that Oregon
should assert an interest in its application in the case where the pur-
chaser contracts in another state for land in another state. 49 This is
a perfectly legitimate and often laudable way to avoid conflict between
state policies.150  Its wisdom in this situation, however, is doubtful.
The policy of the statute was sufficiently strong to lead the court to hold
that the defense was available against a transferee of the notes without
notice that they were secured by purchase-money mortgages;'51 and,
140 4x C.J. § 64 6b. 1 7 23 Ore. at 437, 285 Pac. at 2io.
18 132 Ore. at 447-48, 285 Pac. at 214. (Emphasis added.)
""The court made a telling point concerning the weakness of the policy by citing
its earlier holding in Page v. Ford, 65 Ore. 450, 131 Pac. 1013 (1913), that the
vendor was not denied the right to sue on the obligation. Thus, while we have treated
this circumstance as an oversight on the part of the legislature, the court took it as
ground for doubting the force of the policy.
"' Cf. Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1959) Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-
Laws Method, 75 U. CHm. L. REV. 227, 240-4-1 (1958).
""Wright v. Wimberly, 79 Ore. 6a26, 156 Pac. 257 (1916).
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while the court quoted with apparent approval a statement that "The
act of the parties in entering into a contract at a particular place, in the
absence of anything shown to the contrary, sufficiently indicates their
intention to contract with reference to the laws of that place... ,,12
it would presumably not permit the purchaser in a domestic transaction
to waive the protection of the statute.15 The statute so construed
creates a discrimination against local purchasers who contract in another
state as compared with those who contract locally with reference to local
real estate. We do not suggest that this is a denial of equal protection
of the laws; the legislature may make reasonable classifications, and
this one may be regarded as reasonable on the ground that by not pro-
tecting the local resident who contracts elsewhere the legislature avoided
conflict with the policy of a sister state. We do suggest that local ven-
dors, on discovering that foreign vendors are thus favored by local
law, might justifiably descend upon the legislature and demand either
that the law be repealed or that foreign vendors be subjected to its
restrictions.
In spite of these observations, it may be that the decision should be
regarded as a holding that the legislature did not intend the statute to
apply to mixed cases such as that before the court--i.e., that Oregon
claimed no interest in the application of its policy in such a situation. Al-
ternatively, the court may simply have been bemused by the mysticism
of conflict of laws, finding that the law of the place of contracting (or of
the situs) was "applicable" according to some higher law, and treating
questions of policy as irrelevant except in so far as some extraordinary
aspect of the contract, rendering its enforcement "pernicious and de-
testable," '154 might disturb the normal applicability of the foreign law.
There is ample basis in the opinion for this interpretation. If it is
correct, the decision plainly subordinated the interest of Oregon in
protecting purchasers to the interest of Montana in securing to vendors
the benefit of the bargain. A third interpretation of the decision, and
the one that probably comes closest to the truth (they are not mutually
exclusive), is that the court was contemplating a rule for the application
of the statute to mixed cases which would approximate by indirection
the legislative purpose to protect local purchasers. Despite the empha-
152 132 Ore. at 438, z85 Pac. at zio, quoting 13 C.J. 248.
... Agreements to waive the equity of redemption are void. See 2 JONES, op. cit.
supra note 55, § 13z6; Ray v. Patterson, 17o N.C. 226, 87 S.E. 212 (2925). Cf.
Dennis v. Moses, iS Wash. 537, 583 et seq. (2898) (dissenting opinion).
154 232 Ore. at 445,.285 Pac. at z3. Cf. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Mercury
Realty Co., 97 F. Supp. 491 (D. Mich. 2952), Note, 50MICH. L. REV. f0 9 7'(19 52).
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sis on the law of the place of contracting, the case does not hold that
that law governs except when it is also the law of the situs. The way
was left open for a holding that the statute is applicable where the land
is in Oregon, in which case the majority of Oregon purchasers would
presumably be protected.
South Dakota, on the other hand, in a case having the same factual
pattern, held that, notwithstanding the rule that the law of the place
of contracting governs, enforcement of the personal obligation was con-
trary to the public policy declared by the statute. The purchasers were
residents of South Dakota.
It is often said that a contract valid in the state where made and to be per-
formed is valid everywhere. It does not follow, however, from the fact that
a contract is valid where made and to be performed, that another state will
enforce it by appropriate legal remedy. If the contract is contrary to the
public policy of the forum, remedy will be denied .... By the Act of 1935,
we think it clear that the legislature condemned as inimical to the public
good the enforcement of a personal liability upon a purchase money note
where such note is secured by a mortgage given upon the purchased real
estate and by this Act the legislature closed the courts of this state to the
enforcement of a personal liability upon the note. We believe this definitely
fixed the policy of this state with respect to actions upon notes of the character
described in the law. We notice the fact that the law was passed at a time
when actions based upon purchase money notes, deficiency judgments and
the like, were causing many citizens of this state great hardship and the drastic
effect of such actions on our overall economy was apparent. . . . It follows
that if a contract of the type declared odious by the statute is presented to the
court in this state for enforcement, it will not here be enforced in contradic-
tion to the declared policy of the law and it is immaterial where the contract
was made or originated.' 5 5
Thus, like North Carolina, South Dakota "closed its courts" to such
actions; but the South Dakota court made it clear that not considerations
of judicial administration, but concern for the welfare of South Dakota
citizens dictated this closure as a matter of "public policy."
We have said that such efforts to approximate the legislative pur-
pose to protect local purchasers weaken the case for the validity of the
statute against attacks based on the Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process clauses. When the United States Supreme Court decided
Angel v. Ballington, it did not reach the question of the constitutionality
" Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, 107, i5 N.W.zd 8, 1o
(1944). The statute was also held to protect the guararitors of the note against liability.
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of the North Carolina statute as applied, but treated it as res judicata. 10
What would have happened if Bullington had appealed directly from
the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court? That he could
have done so is dear; the majority in Angel v. Bullington, without
intimating any opinion as to the outcome, emphasized that there was a
substantial question concerning the constitutionality of the statute as
applied, and that the decision was reviewable as a matter of right. 157
Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting, agreed as to the availability of review by
appeal and expressly reserved any opinion as to the outcome.'5 8 Mr.
Justice Rutledge, also dissenting, thought that the chances of a successful
appeal on the merits were so remote as to be hardly worthy of considera-
tion.15 9 If the North Carolina Supreme Court had said forthrightly
that the policy of the statute was to protect purchase-money mortgagors,
and that the state asserted an interest in applying that policy when the
mortgagor was a resident of North Carolina, it is highly probable that
the constitutionality of the statute would have been sustained.10 Noth-
ing in the Constitution requires a state to subordinate its policies and
interests to the conflicting policies and interests of another.' But the
North Carolina Supreme Court said nothing about the policy embodied
in the statute. It said only that the statute operated to close the doors
of the North Carolina courts to such actions. No reasons relating to
the administration of the courts were adduced, and none can be plausibly
imagined. For all that appears, the closure was simply arbitrary. In
such a case two courses are open to the Supreme Court. It may simply
hold that, in the absence of any showing that the statute as applied has
a reasonable basis in governmental policy, it is a denial of full faith and
credit to the public acts and records of a sister state.162  On the other
hand, out of deference to the authority of the state, it may undertake
on its own motion to formulate the policy embodied in the statute and
determine the circumstances in which the state might reasonably assert
120 330 U.S. 183 (1947). 18 1d, at 188-89.
1 81d. at 193, 201. Id, at 204, o5 n. 11, 207, 209.
'"0Cf. Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of LaW, z6 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958). CI.
Note, 24 N.C.L. REv. 267 (.946).
.. Alaska Packers Assn v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (x935). We are
here speaking, of course, in terms of recognition of the law of another state, not of
recognition of sister-state judgments. The North Carolina court correctly enforced a
Pennsylvania judgment for a deficiency without inquiring whether the price obtained
on the sale was inadequate, Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Garman, 22o N.C. 585
(1942).
182 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). See Currie, The Constitution and
the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REV. 36 (1959). See note 16s infra.
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an interest in its application.0 3  While the latter course is preferable,
it imposes a difficult and burdensome task upon the Court, and the state
court is hardly in position to complain if its decision is taken at face
value and the statute treated as simply arbitrary.
Moreover, the statute as construed by the North Carolina court is
a denial of full faith and credit as applied to certain fact situations.
Suppose a case wholly domestic to Virginia except that the action is
brought in North Carolina: both parties are residents of Virginia at the
time of the transaction, the land is located there, and the contract is
made and to be performed there. The purchaser later moves to North
Carolina, where, after foreclosure, he is sued for the deficiency. Ac-
cording to the decision, the action would be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. But North Carolina has no policy relating to court administra-
tion which would justify the dismissal on procedural or jurisdictional
grounds, and has no legitimate interest in the application of its policy
for the protection of purchasers where the purchaser had no connection
with the state at the time of the transaction. 64 The policy of Virginia,
1.3 Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 61g-9 (951).
... An argument may be made that North Carolina has an interest in the applica-
tion of its protective policy, since the purchaser is a resident of the state at the time of
the action. No doubt the result that would be produced if that argument were accepted
is frequently reached by a court's invocation of "local public policy" or its application
of some "procedural" law of the forum. Cf. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: .4
Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 227, 230 n. 1 257 n. 55
(x958). In some situations, there is justification for the result, as where there is inde-
pendent justification for the application of the "public policy" or the rule of procedure,
or where the state may reasonably alter pre-existing legal relations in its exercise of
the police power. The alteration of pre-existing relations, however, is a delicate matter,
and an interest in applying domestic law for the protection of one who entered into a
relationship under circumstances such that the state had no interest in regulating it
should not be lightly asserted. At this point, the principles determining whether a
domestic law should be applied to a foreign situation should be assimilated to those that
determine whether the same law should be applied to prior transactions. The effect of
an unwarranted application of the law is the same in either case: there is an impairment
of the obligation of contract. If the anti-deficiency judgment statute had been intended
by the legislature to apply to pre-existing mortgages, and if such an application would
not be an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts, cf. Richmond
Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 300 U.S. 124 (1937), then
it could be applied in the hypothetical case in the text, not otherwise. Thus, the
"debtor relief" statute designed to insure that the fair value of the security was credited
against the debt, N.C. Laws ch. 275 (1933), validly applicable to pre-existing mort-
gages, might reasonably be held applicable to a wholly foreign transaction where the
mortgagor has become a resident of North Carolina, its purpose being to modify pre-
existing legal relations in the interest of the protection of local residents and the economy
of the state. We need not assert that retrospective application of the deficiency judgment
statute would be an impairment of the obligation of contracts. It is enough that the
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on the other hand, is to give the parties freedom of contract and to
protect the vendor's right to enforce the covenant to pay the agreed
price; l65 and certainly Virginia has an interest in the application of
this policy in the circumstances. When no interest of the forum state
would be infringed by entertaining an action based on the law of a
sister state and applying the foreign law, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires that the action be entertained and the foreign law
applied.'66
We have said that attempts to approximate the legislative purpose
by indirection are increasingly likely to expose the statute to attacks by
residents based on the Equal Protection Clause. This may be illustrated
if we assume that the statute is construed as applying to all transactions
involving domestic land, and only to such transactions.67 On that
assumption, suppose that two citizens of North Carolina contract for
the sale of land in Virginia. The purchaser would be denied the pro-
tection of the statute. Is there a reasonable basis for thus treating him
differently from his neighbors? Perhaps, in the present state of the
law, it would be said that there is; the magic of "situs" as regulating
the incidence of law has not been dissipated. Yet in the case supposed,
the location of the land is quite irrelevant to the policy involved, which
is for the protection of purchasers. North Carolina would be yielding
its policy and interest although there is no conflicting Virginia interest.
The denial to the purchaser of a protection afforded other local pur-
chasers is quite arbitrary; the classification is unreasonable; and the
purchaser has been denied the equal protection of the laws. Some day
this may come to be recognized. Already the Supreme Court has held
unconstitutional two state statutes which denied the administrator of a
resident the right to sue another resident in the courts of the state for
wrongful death solely because the injury and death occurred in another
legislature expressly gave it prospective operation only, thus declaring its intention not
to affect pre-existing obligations, and not to protect all residents of the state irrespective
of when-and where-the obligation was contracted. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken, z66 U.S. 389 (19z4), discussed in Currie, The Constitution and the Choice
of Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9, 4X (1958).
... The right to a deficiency judgment in Virginia may be regarded as statutory,
VA. CODE An. § 55-59(1), (5) (95o), if that fact is thought essential to the applica-
bility of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Cf. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice
of Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, i5 (958).
1 8 See note x 6z supra. See also Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments
and Public Acts, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 33 (1957).
167 See note 140 supra.
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state.' While the result was attributed to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the better explanation for it seems to be that the discrimination
against residents killed outside the state was arbitrary and was a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.'69
The same argument cannot be made against the North Carolina
expedient of holding the statute jurisdictional, since under that construc-
tion, all residents (and, for that matter, nonresidents) are treated alike
by the North Carolina courts. It may be observed, however, that the
statute so construed poorly serves the legislative purpose to protect local
purchasers. If a North Carolina resident in the situation of Dr. Angel
were to be served with process while in Virginia, the Virginia court
would probably hold him liable under Virginia law in any event; but the
North Carolina court has lent encouragement to such a result by its
declaration that the statute does not affect substantive rights, but only
the remedy. Presumably the right to the deficiency is still created by
North Carolina law; only the remedy has been abolished. The Vir-
ginia court might be warranted in saying that in such a situation there
is no conflict of laws at all, the laws of the two states being i n agreement.
The North Carolina court has certainly not asserted any interest on
the part of that state in protecting its residents sued elsewhere. The
concept of a right without a remedy is not meaningless when a remedy
is available in another state.
The inadequacy of the protection afforded by the statute, so con-
strued, is aggravated by the effect of the procedural interpretation upon
the operation of the judgment as res judicata. A judgment dismissing
for lack of jurisdiction is not a judgment "on the merits"'70 such as
10 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 6o9 ('95i) ; First National Bank of Chicago v.
United Air Lines, 342 U.s. 396 (1952).
... See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 36 (1959).
... RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49 (i94z). We would be better off without this
troublesome phrase. The United States Supreme Court held that the judgment of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Bullington v. Angel was one "on the merits," in the
sense that it precluded the second action in a federal court in North Carolina and pre-
cluded also relitigation of the constitutionality of the statute. Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. IS3 (1947). The second action was precluded because "For purposes of
diversity jurisdiction a federal court is, 'in effect, only another court of the State.'" Id.
at x87. This and similar problems would be clarified if, instead of discussing whether
a judgment is or is not "on the merits," we simply inquired: What did the judgment
determine? The judgment in Bullington 'o. Angel determined (i) that the statute
deprived all North Carolina state courts of jurisdiction to entertain such actions,- and
1z) that the statute was constitutional as applied to the case before the court. Because
of the Erie doctrine, the first of these determinations precluded a second action in a
North Carolina federal court, if it was constitutionali and the question of constitu-,
tionality was res judicata.
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will bar a subsequent suit on the same cause of action in another state.
If Bullington, after losing in the North Carolina courts, had, instead
of resorting to a North Carolina federal court, sued Angel in Virginia,
either in a state or a federal court, the judgment in the North Carolina
action could not have been pleaded successfully in bar. Indeed, even
today, after adverse judgments in both the state and federal courts of
North Carolina, Bullington can probably recover if the Virginia limita-
tion period has not expired, or if the statute has been tolled by Angel's
absence from the state, provided process can be served in Virginia. The
situation would be quite different if the North Carolina court had
simply said that the statute was designed to protect North Carolina
purchasers, and was applicable to the case at bar. That would have
been a judgment "on the merits" precluding another action anywhere;
that is, it would have adjudicated that the North Carolina statute was
applicable, and that under that statute there was no liability.
We have said that attempts to approximate the legislative purpose
by indirection are not necessary in order to guard the statute against
attacks by nonresidents based on the Privileges and Immunities and
Equal Protection clauses. In order to effectuate the legislative purpose,
it is not necessary for the court to assert that the statute will be applied
only for the protection of North Carolina purchasers, and for no others.
The legislature, we may assume, is quite content to have the protection
of the statute afforded to any person who, under the Constitution, is
entitled to equal treatment with citizens of North Carolina. Thus,
resident aliens would dearly be entitled to the benefit of the statute by
virtue of the Equal Protection Clause.17' A full inquiry into the extent
to which the protection of the statute must be afforded to persons other
than those for whose benefit it was primarily intended would be beyond
the scope of this paper.Y It is very dear, however, that nothing in
the Constitution requires a state to apply its laws and its notions of policy
indiscriminately to the people of other states; on the contrary, any such
evangelical impartiality may be simply officious intermeddling, amount-
ing to a denial of due process of law. Thus, when Missouri applied its
statute providing against forfeiture of life insurance policies to a con-
tract which, though made within the state, was made between a non-
resident and a foreign corporation, altruistically proclaiming the pur-
pose of the legislature to extend its protective policy to "all persons
""Cf. Truax v. Raich, z39 U.S. 33 (igi5); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334. U.S. 410 (1948).
17" Such an inquiry has been undertaken by the senior author in collaboration with
Herna Hill Schreter, J.D. 1959, The University of Chicago Law School.
[Vol. ig6o: i
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whether citizens, inhabitants, transients, visitors or sojourners," 173 the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed on the basis of the Due Process
Clause.'74 The difficult question concerns the case in which the vendor
is a resident of North Carolina and the purchaser is a nonresident. The
purchaser's home state may or may not provide similar protection.
Whether, in either or both of these cases, he can successfully assert a
right to the same protection which the statute affords to resident pur-
chasers is a question we shall not attempt to answer here. For present
purposes, it is enough to state that the existence of this problem should
not deter the courts from construing such statutes in such a way as to
effectuate fully the legislative purpose to protect local purchasers. If
others are constitutionally entitled to the same protection, the courts can
afford it cheerfully and directly. Indirection and approximation,
prompted by conflict-of-laws dogma and by fears of unconstitutional
discrimination, should be abandoned as instruments for effectuating
legislative policy.
VII
CONCLUSION
We have endeavored in these pages to consider what is known as a
problem in the conflict of laws. The branch of the law which purports
to provide solutions for such problems has provided no help. Since
the problem is one concerning mortgages, we have turned to the law
of mortgages, in which we do not claim expertise, and have sought such
enlightenment as is available in works on real estate practice. Experts
in mortgage law and real estate finance could have done the job better.
The problem turns out to be one of mortgage law and constitutional
law. We hope we have demonstrated that this is so, and that it is vain
to expect to find, in an oversimplified and mystical specialty, solutions
to all the problems that may arise concerning the application of domes-
tic law, in any of its manifold branches, to cases having foreign aspects.
We hope also that we have demonstrated that the practicing lawyer's
best hope of predicting the decision of a court concerning such applica-
tion of domestic law, and of persuading the court to reach the desired
result, is to ascertain and make clear the policy of the domestic law and
the extent of the state's interest in applying that policy.
27S Head v. New York Life Ins. Co., 241 Mo. 4o3, 416, 147 S.W. 827, 831 (1912).
... New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914). New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (i9oo), upholding the application of the statute in a mixed
case, was distinguished on the ground that there the insurance was on the life of a
citizen of Missouri. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, z6 U. CHI. L.
REv. 9, 38 (1958).
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